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Minor works of Madhvācārya

KHANDANATRAYAM

Upādhikhaṇḍanam, Māyāvādakhaṇḍanam
&
Prapañcamithyātvānumānakhaṇḍanam

Introduction, English Translation & Notes

by

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"गंभोरविज्जलोपेतं दुष्कृतशालवक्षसम् ।
आनन्दतोर्वहुमग्नविभ्रं भजेहं वुद्धिगुदये ॥"

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FOREWORD

The Volume sponsored for publication by the Suktindra Oriental Research Institute is the group of three tracts by Śrī Madhva from his *Daśaprakaraṇas*. The three tracts *Māyāvāda-Upādhi* and *Prapañca Mi-thyātva-numāna Khaṇḍanas* constitute a powerful challenge to the monistic idealism of Śaṅkara. Śrī G.M. Bhat's translation, introduction and notes are faithful and lucid. The author has consulted Jayatirtha's gloss on the works. A study of these three works discloses the logical acumen of the Ācārya who is rightly called *Anumāna-tirtha*. His philosophy is a self-conscious critical system arguing its conclusions on the plane of pure philosophy, well-supported by scripture with a complete dialectical indication of the position against the competing schools of Vedānta. It is a matter of great joy that the works of Śrī Madhva are being published with translations making good the lapses of the historians of Indian Philosophy who have all along ill-served the philosophy of Śrī Madhva.

The Institute has done good service to the cause of propagation of Dualistic Vedānta by this publication. The book will be welcomed by all students interested in Śrī Madhva's philosophy.

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Sd/-
P. Nagaraja Rao

Preface

The Philosophy of Madhvācārya i. e. Dvaita Vedānta has not yet received due attention of the Scholarly world. Scholars like R. N. Sharma, B. N. K. Sharma, etc. have made significant contributions to this field. Yet literature as a whole on Dvaita Vedānta is quite meagre. Though texts on Dvaita Vedānta are prescribed at the University level for introducing the same to the students, no texts are available explained in English for the use of the students. It is in answer to this need that we are presenting this small volume containing annotated versions of three of the Minor works of Madhvācārya viz. Upādhi—Mayāvāda and Prapañcamithyātva-numāna-khaṇḍanas, for the use of the students in particular and the public in general.

We wish to express our gratitude to the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, Govt. of India for the financial assistance rendered towards the publication of the work.

We are deeply indebted to Dr. B. N. K. Sharma who after having gone through the manuscript, contributed his learned suggestions aimed at further improvement of the work.

We are also thankful to Dr. Nagaraja Rao for contributing his valuable Foreword to this book.

Sukrtindra Oriental
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Cochin-682002.
Vijayādaśami.
21. October 1977.

G. K. Pai
Director.

INTRODUCTION

Madhva's Life and Times.

Sri Madhvācārya, also known as Pūrṇaprajña and Ānandatīrtha, was born in a small village named Pājakakṣetra, near Udipi in South Kanara. Different scholars give different dates as the date of his birth but the most favoured one is 1238 A. D.

Madhva's parents were Tulu Brahmins* but very little is known about them. His father's name was Madhyagehabhaṭṭa. Madhyageha is said to be the Sanskrit equivalent of Naḍuvantillaya in Tulu. Madhva was a strong, healthy and handsome boy and possessed an uncommon intelligence. He is said to have embraced saṁnyāsa at a very early age and was initiated by Acyutaprekṣa, a saṁnyāsin camping at Udipi. His Guru gave him the name of Pūrṇaprajña and began to teach him Advaita. But soon Pūrṇaprajña raised objections which the teacher found difficult to answer. He advised his pupil to take charge of the Maṭha and teach the other pupils there according to his own views. He also conferred the name of Ānandatīrtha on this extraordinary pupil, on this occasion.

After teaching the pupils of Acyutaprekṣa for some time, Madhva went on a pilgrimage to the sacred shrines of the south with a few followers. At Trivandrum he

* For a different view vide "Sriṁan Madhvācāryaru Āṇḍa Sārasvata Brāhmaṇaru" (in Kannada) by Vidyābhūṣaṇa Paṇḍita Kārkala Padmanabha Puranik. Mysore, 1972.

-Editor

plicity of the universe and the empirical knowledge of man is not to be denied for a moment. But those who came after him and supported the idealistic view, rejected even the partial realism of Śaṅkara and went to the extent of declaring the world an illusion (Mithyā). In doing so, they had entered a maze and found themselves confused and lost, for they were not able to give a satisfactory explanation of the world consistent with life's experiences. They tried to explain the term Mithyā (Māyā) in various ways but failed to convince. In the meanwhile the Purāṇas with their theories of a Personal God began to exert their influence on the people, with the result that Rāmānuja, who came two centuries after Śaṅkara, asserted the view, that the explanation of the world and of the individual souls as mere products of illusion, was wholly wrong. On the contrary, he maintained that the two elements, the world and the individual souls, had a definite entity of their own, which was perfectly real, and that the Brahman is not an impersonality, but a personal being. The theistic tendencies nurtured by the Purāṇas helped Rāmānuja a good deal to place on a philosophic basis the worship of Viṣṇu. The Viṣṇu-worship of the masses was brought in accord with the philosophy of the Upaniṣads by introducing the Bhakti Mārga and the doctrine of Surrender (Prapatti). Madhva, who came two centuries after Rāmānuja, found it easy to preach Vaiṣṇavism, holding aloft the banner of Bhakti. He undertook the task of proclaiming to the masses that man is the servant of God and could save himself only by means of sincere devotion to him. The important tenets of his philosophy of Dualism are summarised in the verse:

श्रीमन्महामते हरिः परतरः सत्यं जगत्त्वतो
भेदो जीवगणा हरेरनुचरा नीचोच्चभावं गताः ।

मुक्तिर्नैजगुबानुभूतिरमला भक्तिश्च तत्साधने
ह्यक्षादित्रितयं प्रमाणमखिलान्नायकवेद्यो हरिः ॥

Madhva's Philosophy:

The nine important tenets of Mādhva Philosophy that are noticed in the above verse are the following:

1. Hari (Viṣṇu) is the Supreme Being.
2. The world is real.
3. Difference is real.
4. The individual souls are dependent on Hari.
5. There are gradations among the souls.
6. Mukti is the enjoyment of the soul's innate bliss.
7. Pure devotion to Hari is the only means of attaining Mukti.
8. Pratyakṣa and the rest are the three Pramāṇas.
9. Hari is knowable only through all the Vedas.

These are called the nine gems of propositions propounded by Madhva. These nine propositions will serve us as convenient topics for making a brief survey of the philosophy of Dualism as propounded by Madhva.

The first tenet that engages our attention is, 'Hari is the Supreme Being'. He is the only independent being according to Madhva. All the other gods are dependent on him. It is Madhva's conviction that in the Vedas, the Rāmāyaṇa, the Purāṇa and Bhārata, in the beginning, end and middle, everywhere Viṣṇu alone is praised.

“वेदे रामायणे चैव पुराणे भारते तथा ।
आदावन्ते च मध्ये च विष्णुः सर्वत्र गीयते ॥”

This means that there is only one Supreme Being, Viṣṇu and that all names denote Him only. He

is full of all auspicious qualities and ever perfect, and all the scriptures praise him only.

The next postulate of Madhva that deserves our attention is that which declares the world as real. Inquisitiveness of man makes him ask questions about the world which surrounds him and tries to find answers for the same. Among the philosophical speculations on these questions the views of Śaṅkara and his followers describing this universe as mere appearance, and those of Madhva and his followers who describe this world as real, are worthy of consideration. In a nutshell, Śaṅkara's views, familiarly known as Māyāvāda are as follows: Brahman is the one Absolute Reality; all the rest are mere appearances, which are bound to disappear as soon as true knowledge of the Reality is attained. The world may be likened to a dream, which is true while it lasts but vanishes when the sleeper awakens. But Madhva emphatically declares, 'जगत्प्रवाहः सत्योज्यं नैव मिथ्या कथंचन' which contradicts the Māyāvāda theory. It may be asked how far the Upaniṣads support this theory: for the absolutists maintain that Brahman alone is real and all the rest is unreal and quote relevant passages from the Upaniṣads in support of their contention. The Taittirīyopaniṣad defines Brahman thus:

यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति
यत्प्रयत्यभिसंविशन्ति, तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्मेति ॥

'Know that to be Brahman from which all these beings are born, that by which they live after being born, that towards which they move and into which they merge.'

Brahman is declared to be the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer in unmistakable terms. In another

context there is the declaration: 'स तपस्तप्त्वा इदं सर्वमसृजत तत् सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्' which says that the Brahman created all this and having created, entered into that very thing. When there are such express statements regarding creation of the world by Brahman, to deny reality to such a world is not sensible. Everyday experience leads us to the conclusion that world is real and of a category quite different from the world of dreams. Pratyakṣa and Āgama both point to the reality of the world. Hence Madhva contends that world is real.

It is also Madhva's contention that differences are real as opposed to the Absolutist's view that differences are illusory. According to him there are three eternal entities, viz., God, souls and matter. He postulates a five-fold difference between them. It is as follows:

- 1) Difference between God and individual soul.
- 2) Difference between God and matter.
- 3) Difference between individual soul and matter.
- 4) Difference between one individual soul and another.
- 5) Difference between one form of matter and another.

According to Madhva these distinctions are vital and real. If there is identity, he argues, what happens to one must equally affect the other. As it is not so, things are different. He also maintains difference is the nature of things.

सत्यं भेदस्तु वस्तूनां स्वरूपं नात्र संशयः ।

Two things may be similar to each other; all the same, they are different. For instance, the Brahman and the soul have common characteristics: both are in-

telligent by nature; both have bliss as their characteristic; both are eternal. Yet they are not identical, they are different. The Māyāvādins whose attempts are directed towards discovering the essence in this world of names and forms take their cue from the Upaniṣadic statement,

वाचस्पत्यं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यं²

which means that the different forms and names such as pot, etc. are merely conventional distinctions while earth alone is their essence. Similarly the different names and forms of things in this world are different from one another in so far as their forms and names are concerned, while their essence is the Brahman which is the one and only reality. According to the Māyāvādin differences are therefore apparent, the reality is one and one only. It is obvious, therefore, that difference of opinion regarding these differences, the one calling it real and the other unreal, is caused by the difference in standpoint. Madhva's opinion is from the standpoint of the worldly man while that of Śaṅkara and his followers is that of the idealist.

The next proposition, the idea of which Madhva must have borrowed from Rāmānuja's doctrine of Surrender (Prapatti), is that the individual souls are completely dependent upon the grace of Viṣṇu, the Highest Being. Madhva also believes that their number is infinite. Only Viṣṇu and his consort, Lakṣmī, are eternally free from bondage; while all others Brahmā downwards are counted as Jivas, are bound by saṁsāra and are dependent on the grace of Viṣṇu. 'There are gradations among them but for convenience of classification, they are divided into three great groups, viz. those fit for salvation, those fit for eternal saṁsāra and those fit for

2. Chāndogya Upaniṣad. VI. 1-4

eternal hell. In the first class are the devas, the ṛṣis, pitṛs and the best among men like Janaka, Ambariṣa, etc. To the second class belong the large majority of mankind who are not considered good enough for eternal happiness nor bad enough for eternal punishment. In the last class fall the daityas, the piśācas and such other evil spirits and the worst among mankind who are fit only for hell' (Tattvasaṁkhyāna).

Mukti, the summum bonum of life, has come to be conceived differently by different religionists and philosophers. Root meaning of the word mukti or mokṣa denotes deliverance from saṁsāra and this seems to have been the original significance. According to Śaṅkara, mokṣa is the direct realisation of something which is existent from eternity. It is the realisation of its infinity and absoluteness. He also declares in many places that the nature of liberation is a state of oneness with Brahman. The state of mokṣa is none other than one's own inherent nature as Brahman and is not an acquired state like Svarga. Madhva's conception of mokṣa is also not very different from this; only he omits its connection with Brahman. Brahman being quite different from Jiva, the difference 'persists even in the state of mokṣa. So Madhva defines mokṣa as the state of experiencing the bliss which is the intrinsic nature of the Jiva.

'मुक्तिर्नैवमुत्तमानुभूतिः'

This liberation is obtained by Jiva only by God's grace for which one has to strive. This is made pos-

1. 'विमतो भिन्नः मुक्तत्वात्'—Tattvodyota.

sible by pure Bhakti. Madhva defines bhakti as 'that love which is the result of the knowledge of the greatness of God, which is firm and exceeds the love of all other objects'.

माहात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वस्तु मुदृढस्सर्वतोऽधिकः स्नेहो भक्तिरिति प्रोक्तः २

And it is by means of such bhakti that liberation is obtained.

'तया मुक्तिर्न चान्यथा' २

Coming to Madhva's recognition of Pramāṇas, we find that he accepts only three Pramāṇas, viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Āgama. Different schools of philosophy have adopted different numbers of Pramāṇas. Thus Naiyāyikas accept four Pramāṇas, the Sāṃkhyas three, and Mīmāṃsakas six. It is Madhva's contention that knowledge of God can be obtained only through Āgamas whereas some other schools, the Naiyāyikas, for example, hold that the existence of God can be proved by Anumāna also.

These in brief are the fundamental doctrines of the Dvaita school of philosophy as propounded by Madhvācārya.

Madhva's works.

Madhvācārya has written as many as 37 works, most of them commentaries on standard works of religion and philosophy, and some of them original treatises on philosophical topics, besides a few stotras. The list as given by a biographer is as follows:

2. Bhāratatātparyanirṇaya-I.86.

- | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1. Rgbhāṣya | |
| 2. Aitareyopaniṣad Bhāṣya | |
| 3. Isāvāsyopaniṣad | " |
| 4. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad | " |
| 5. Kāṭhakopaniṣad | " |
| 6. Chāndogyopaniṣad | " |
| 7. Taittirīyopaniṣad | " |
| 8. Talavakāropaniṣad | " |
| 9. Maṇḍūkopaniṣad | " |
| 10. Atharvaṇopaniṣad | " |
| 11. Praśnopaniṣad | " |
| 12. Brahmasūtra | " |
| 13. Anuvyākhyāna | Commentaries |
| 14. Anubhāṣya | on Brahmasūtra. |
| 15. Nyāyavivaraṇa | |
| 16. Gītā Bhāṣya | Commentaries on |
| 17. Gītā Tātparya Nirṇaya | Bhagavad Gītā. |
| 18. Bhāgavata Tātparya | |
| 19. Mahābhārata Tātparya | |
| | Nirṇaya |
| 20. Yamaka Bhārata | |
| 21. Pramāṇa Lakṣaṇa | |
| 22. Kathālakṣaṇa | |
| 23. Upādhikhaṇḍana | |
| 24. Māyāvādakhaṇḍana | |
| 25. Prapañcamithyātva-numāna | |
| | Khaṇḍana |
| 26. Tattvasaṃkhyāna | |
| 27. Tattvaviveka | |
| 28. Tattvodyota | |
| 29. Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya | |
| 30. Karmanirṇaya | |

Daśaprakaraṇas

31. Dvādaśastotra
32. Narasimhanakhaṣṭuti
33. Kṛṣṇāmṛtamahārṇava
34. Tantrasāra
35. Sadācārasmṛti
36. Yatipraṇavakalpa
37. Jayantinirṇaya.

The above 37 works can be conveniently classified into four groups. The first group consists of commentaries on the R̥gveda, the Bhagavadgita, the Brahmasūtras and the ten major Upaniṣads. The second group is comprised of the epitomies of Mahābhārata and Bhāgavata (Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya and Bhāgavatatātparya) and a Yamakabhārata. The third group, consisting of short treatises, called the Dasaprakaranas, elucidating the basic principles of the Dvaita system, is very important as it contains a systematic exposition of ontological and epistemological theories of the Dvaita system. The fourth group consists of hymns and works on Tantra. For a detailed account of these works the reader is referred to Dr. B. N. K. Sharma's 'History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature'.

UPĀDHIKHAṆḌANAM

INTRODUCTION

The Upādhikhaṇḍanam is one of the minor works of Madhvācārya, belonging to the group called Daśa-prakarana. This small treatise consisting of 20 verses criticises the theory of Upādhi put forward by the Advaita Philosophers, to explain how the one Supreme Being, Brahman, has become many individual souls, steeped in misery. It is their theory that the multiplicity of souls in this world is due to the limiting adjuncts (Upādhi) of name and form which are the products of nescience (Avidyā), just as the universal space is seen as many on account of the limiting adjuncts of jars, pots and so on. They hold the view that the individual souls appear to be miserable on account of their being limited by a body having sense organs. Really they are not so; they are identical with the Brahman whose nature is bliss.

It is this theory that forms the target of Madhva's attack here. Madhva opens his attack by pointing out that the very idea of a nescience descending upon Brahman, whose very nature is absolute knowledge, is unthinkable. How can an all-knowing Brahman be affected by ignorance? Two contradictories cannot coexist. The advaitin may answer that it is due to upādhi (the body, the sense organs etc. with which the soul is limited). Admitting for argument's sake that the ignorance is caused by upādhi, Madhva says that two alternatives are possible. Either the upādhi

may be Brahman's intrinsic nature or it may be caused by ignorance. If the first alternative is accepted, It means, according to Madhva, there are two entities, the Brahman and the upādhi. That means there is dualism and not monism. If it is the second alternative that is accepted then it would mean that the upādhi is caused by a previous layer of ignorance, that ignorance will require an upādhi to account for it and thus it would go on ad infinitum. The argument is defective on account of this regressus ad infinitum. If it is contended that there is only one ignorance and one upādhi, then there is the defect of mutual interdependence. On the other hand, if a limited number of upādhis and avidyās are admitted, then there would result argument in a circle which is defective. Therefore it is not reasonable to postulate an upādhi to account for the ignorance attributed to Brahman. So the contention that ignorance is caused by upādhi is to be abandoned.

Then again Madhva is prepared to grant for argument's sake that there is upādhi which brings about a difference between the Brahman and jīva which makes it possible for the jīva to be ignorant even though Brahman is omniscient. So according to the Advaitin, where no difference existed before, upādhi brings about a difference. But Madhva points out that such is not the function of upādhi in any known case. Its function is always to make clear a difference which already exists. For example, there is difference between different parts of space. The erection of walls and a roof over them, which we call building a house, only makes this difference more prominent. That portion of space, now enclosed by walls, was always different from the rest of space,

but we could not readily distinguish this part until the walls were erected. Similarly, all upādhis only exhibit prominently a difference that already exists. It does not bring about a difference where none existed before. Therefore, upādhis cannot produce difference between Brahman and jīva, if they were really identical.

Moreover, if there were identity between one individual soul and another, the experience of pleasure or pain on the part of one soul must affect the other too. This is not so. Further if we and Brahman are one, He must share our sorrows and ignorance which everybody will admit, is never the case. So it has to be concluded that the Brahman and the jīva are quite different entities. There exists a radical and eternal difference between the Brahman and the jīva. The difference between the Brahman and the jīva consists in their intrinsic qualities. The Brahman is omnipotent, omniscient and never touched by the slightest defect whereas the jīva is quite the contrary in its nature as its qualities are imperfect. Such being the case, what is reasonable is to admit that the Brahman and the Ātman are radically different in their qualities. Their difference is real and eternal. Many passages in the scriptures speak of this difference between the individual and Supreme souls. Still if the Advaitin persists on his theory of identity, Madhva points out an absurd result that would follow. Just as the Supreme Soul is omniscient so too the individual souls would be omniscient. There would be no one who is ignorant. There would be no one who is in need of the study of the Vedas in order to get true knowledge. There would be nothing which could be called unknown. Consequently the śāstras would have no

proper subject to deal with. Nobody would derive any benefit by the study of śāstras. The Advaitin's theory of identity thus nullifies everything. No such absurd result follows from Dualism.

Such, in brief, is the line of discussion followed in the Upādhikhaṇḍana. The above is a refutation of the concept of upādhi, which in the words of Śaṅkarācārya, is as follows: "The declaration of the difference of the embodied self and the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, presented by nescience, and is not absolutely true. For, the self within is one only; two internal selves are not possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one self is practically treated as if it were two, just as we make a distinction between the space of the jar and the universal space."¹

"There is in reality one self only. But this Highest self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz., the body, the senses and the mind, is by the ignorant spoken of as if it were embodied. Similarly the space although in reality unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and other vessels".²

The concept of upādhi was introduced by Śaṅkarācārya in order to reconcile the two sets of statements in the Upaniṣads, one declaring Brahman and Ātman to be identical while the other set declaring the two to be different. Śaṅkarācārya maintains the view that the statements of identity are true and

1. Śaṅkara Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra I. 2.20.

2. Śaṅkara Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra I. 2.6

explains away the other contradicting statements by means of his concept of upādhi. Madhvācārya, on the other hand, contends that Dualism is the correct view of things and so refutes the Advaitic point of view. His arguments in refuting the theory of upādhi are presented in this small treatise of 20 verses. The concept of upādhi is acceptable to Madhvācārya also. The difference in their views regarding upādhi is merely this. Śaṅkarācārya says upādhi is the cause of difference between the jīva and the Brahman; while Madhvācārya says that the difference is already there; the upādhi merely serves to exhibit it prominently.

(विद्यमानस्य भेदस्य ज्ञापको नैव कारकः)

All the same Madhvācārya has pointed out many serious logical defects in the arguments of the Advaitin and proved that it would be less cumbersome to admit that there is an intrinsic difference between the Brahman and Ātman. The topic is dealt with more elaborately in the Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya.

like Agni, Mitra, Varuṇa, Indra etc. but we have the testimony of the Vedic poets themselves, viz.

एकं सद्विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति

'One only is the Reality, the Brāhmaṇas speak of Him as many' (The same Reality manifests in different forms due to various causes).

This idea is extended to other religious texts such as the Purāṇas, etc. and affirmed that all of them praise only the one Supreme Being. Viṣṇu, Śrī Madhva reiterates at every turn that Viṣṇu is the Highest Being.

cf:

शृणुतामलसत्यवचः परमं

नपथेरितमुच्छ्रितबाहुयुगम् ।

न हरेः परमः न हरेः सदृशः

परमः स तु सर्वचिदात्मगणात् ।

'Listen to my words, pure and true, uttered with uplifted hands and on oath. There is no one greater than Hari; none equal to Him; He is greater than all the sentient beings'.

Such is Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Being, and it is on such a Being that the Advaitins superimpose 'ignorance' in order to explain His manifestation as the beings of the universe. So Śrī Madhva attacks this idea at the very outset.

Text:

अज्ञताखिलसंवेत्तुर्घटते न कुतश्चन

Translation: The idea of attributing ignorance to the omniscient Being is unaccountable by any reason whatsoever.

Explanation: The Advaitins support the view of the Upaniṣads that the Jivātman and the Brahman are identical. But in order to establish this identity they have to answer certain objections. For instance, the Brahman is declared to be an eternal Being possessing absolute knowledge, and limitless with regard to time and space. The individual soul, on the other hand, is subject to change from time to time, is ignorant, and limited in extent. Further, the Brahman is characterised by eternal bliss; whereas the individual soul is subjected to misery. How can two such entities of contrary nature be identical? Śaṅkarācārya tries to answer this objection by postulating the theory of ignorance (avidyā) and illusion (māyā). The concepts of māyā and of avidyā are intimately connected with each other. The world of experience is traced to the force of avidyā. Then the question arises: whose is this avidyā? It cannot be Brahman's whose nature is pure knowledge. How can there be a place for darkness in the sun? It cannot belong to the souls as they are not distinct from Brahman. Śaṅkarācārya's explanation is that avidyā is something inexplicable, something which somehow exists and causes the immutable Brahman to appear as the world of beings. The effect of avidyā alone is discernible to us, not the process how it clung to Brahman. He says in his bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra II.1.14: 'Belonging to the self, as it were, of the omniscient Brahman, there are name and form, which are creations of avidyā not to be defined as being or non-being'. And He, the Brahman, depends on these limiting adjuncts of name and form, just as the universal space depends on the limiting adjuncts of jars, pots, etc. Thus is introduced the new concept of upādhi (limiting adjunct) over and

above the other two concepts of *māyā*, and *avidyā*. The omniscient Brahman becomes the individual soul, limited in nature, being confined by *upādhi*. On account of its limited nature, ignorance (*ajñatā*) becomes possible in its case. Madhvācārya attacks this position also when he says:

Text: उपाधिभेदात् घटत इति चेत्त स्वभावतः अज्ञानतो वा

Translation: If your contention is that ignorance becomes compatible with omniscience on account of the difference (between the Supreme soul and individual soul) caused by the limiting adjunct, the question arises whether this limiting adjunct belongs to the intrinsic nature of the Brahman or is caused by ignorance.

Explanation: Madhvācārya begins his refutation of the Advaitin's theory of *upādhi* by pointing the glaring absurdity in supposing that ignorance and omniscience can coexist in Brahman. Dr. Radhakrishnan too observes 'But how *avidyā* and Brahman can coexist is just the problem for which we do not have any solution.'¹ The Advaitin says, 'the individual soul is in contact with body, sense-organs etc. which constitute the limiting adjuncts of the soul and on account of this limitation ignorance becomes possible.' He has an example ready in hand to make his position clear. There is the mirror which reflects the face. When there is dirt on the mirror, the reflection appears dirty, but the face is clean. Similarly, the individual soul, having come under the influence of the body, the sense-organs, etc., which constitute the *upādhi*, can very well be ignorant; even though the Brahman is omniscient.

1. Indian Philosophy Vol. I. p. 577.

Madhvācārya examines the nature of this *upādhi*. He posits two alternatives. The *upādhi* may be the result of the intrinsic nature of the Brahman; or it may be caused by ignorance. The Advaitins have nowhere said that the *upādhi* is caused by the intrinsic nature of the Brahman, yet Madhvācārya states this in order to exhaust the alternatives. The other alternative is stated by them in so many words, 'owing to its limiting adjunct, consisting of organs of action etc., caused by *avidyā*'¹

Admitting the first alternative will be contrary to the Advaitic view of philosophy while the second alternative involves faulty arguments as is pointed out in the next verse:

Text: द्वैतस्य सत्यता स्वत एव चेत् ।

अनवस्थितिरज्ञानहेतो वान्योन्यसिद्धिता ।

Translation: If the *Upādhi* is said to be due to the intrinsic nature of Brahman then Dualism is established as true. On the other hand if *upādhi* is said to be caused by *avidyā* (*ajñāna*) then there occurs the fallacy of regressus ad infinitum or of vicious reciprocity.

Explanation: Examining the alternatives one by one, Madhvācārya points out the faults in the argument. If it is due to the intrinsic nature of Brahman, then *upādhi* becomes as real as Brahman and the Advaitin will have to admit two realities instead of one. That means Dualism is established, which the Advaitin will never accept. If the *upādhi* is said to be

1. Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra I. 2.20

caused by ignorance (avidyā), then the argument is faulty; for, this ignorance, which is the cause of the first upādhi, will itself need another upādhi as its cause; that upādhi again will require another ignorance as its cause and so it will go on to infinity. There will be no end. The fault is technically known as anavasthā, ('Regressus ad Infinitum'). If the Advaitin insists that there are no infinite upādhis or infinite avidyās but only one upādhi and avidyā, these two will be interdependent, upādhi causing avidyā and avidyā in its turn causing upādhi. This is certainly a faulty argument, the fault being anyonyāśraya. It is just like saying A is the father of B as well as the son of B which is absurd. So the case of there being one avidyā and one upādhi is unacceptable. To prevent this difficulty of anyonyāśrayadoṣa the Advaitin contends that the upādhi does not directly cause avidyā. It causes only difference; and this difference causes ignorance. Even here the fault does not disappear. Instead of the fault of mutual dependence, there is the fault of arguing in a circle. This is how it stands. Upādhi causes difference, this difference causes ignorance. But the upādhi itself is said to be caused by ignorance. So there is a movement in a vicious circle and this defect is pointed out by Śrī Madhva in the line

Text: चक्रकापत्तिरयथा

Translation: Or there is the defect called argument in a circle.

Explanation: After pointing out these formal fallacies in the arguments forwarded by the Advaitins in support of their contention that ignorance on the part

of the individual soul is due to the limiting adjuncts (upādhis), body, sense-organs etc., which are the causes of the difference between the individual soul and the Supreme soul, Śrī Madhva points out the material fallacy contained in the argument that upādhis cause difference. He questions the validity of the presumption.

Text: भेदश्चोपाधितः कुतः

Translation: Further, how can difference result from upādhi?

Explanation: One of the main principles of Mādhva philosophy (Dvaita Philosophy) is the theory of five-fold difference. Contrary to Advaita contention, that the individual soul is none other than the Supreme Soul¹ and that the apparent difference is caused by upādhi², Śrī Madhva propounds his theory of difference. According to this theory, 'Difference is the nature of things'³; and there is the five-fold difference⁴ between the real things in this universe; viz.

- i) Difference between Supreme soul and individual soul.
- ii) Difference between Supreme soul and the material object.

1. जीवो ब्रह्मेव नापरः ।

2. उपाधिनिमित्तं जयमात्मभेदः ।

Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra III. 2.25-

3. पदार्थस्वरूपत्वं भेदस्य ।

4. जीवेश्वरमिदा चैव ब्रह्मेश्वरमिदा तथा

जीवभेदो मिथश्चैव जडजीवमिदा तथा

मिथश्च जडभेदोऽयं प्रपञ्चो भेदपञ्चकः ।

Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya

- iii) Difference between individual soul and material object.
- iv) Difference between two individual souls.
- v) Difference between two material objects.

Contending that differences are real, he maintains that causal relation between upādhi and bheda is assumed without proper analysis. It is human nature to assume that one thing is the cause of another merely because we see them happen together in a number of cases. The argument is vitiated by the fallacy of false cause. Madhva contends that upādhi can never be the cause of the difference. The difference is already there. Upādhi may be said to make it manifest.

Text: विद्यमानस्य भेदस्य ज्ञापको नैव कारकः

उपाधिर्दृष्टपूर्वो हि ॥

Translation: In all the instances seen before, upādhi merely indicates a difference which is already there. It has never been seen as the cause of new differences.

Explanation: Śrī Madhva states here what his concept of upādhi is and what its function is according to him. Anything that limits the activities of a thing is its upādhi. The body, sense-organs, etc. of a particular individual are the upādhis of that particular jīva. This general notion about upādhi is acceptable to Śrī Madhva also. Where he differs from the Advaitins is with regard to the function of the upādhis. He insists that upādhis merely point out the difference that exists and do not create differences anew; whereas the Advaitin contends that upādhis cause the difference.

It is interesting to note that both the contenders admit that there is difference between the Brahman and the Jīva, both of them concede that the Jīva is limited by the upādhis and also that there is a connection between the difference and the upādhi. While the Advaitin avers that it is the upādhi that causes the difference, Śrī Madhva insists that the difference is already there which the upādhi merely points out clearly. Or in other words Śrī Madhva maintains that the difference is svarūpabheda and not aupādhikabheda, thus refuting the view, उपाधिनिमित्तोऽयं भेदः । While the Advaitin maintains that 'difference' is illusory, Śrī Madhva affirms that 'difference' is real and eternal.

Madhva's theory of upādhi is closely interwoven with his theory of difference. To make it clear he takes up the illustration usually employed by the Advaitins and analyses it giving his own interpretation.

Text: वेऽपि देशान्तरस्य सः ।

ज्ञापको विद्यमानस्य सूक्ष्मबुद्धिव्यपेक्षया ॥

Translation: When upādhis like pot etc. come into contact with a portion of space and divide it into bits of space, different from space as a whole, it has only made manifest the portion that already existed there (and has not created anything new). Thus the upādhi makes the difference clear to those who are a bit dull-witted.

Explanation: The Advaitins have recourse to the illustration of space and jar in order to make clear the function of upādhi. This is what Śaṅkarācārya says in his Sūtra Bhāṣya: 'The Supreme Self, when limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body, the sense-organs

etc., is spoken of by the ignorant as the individual soul; just as space, though in reality unlimited, appears as limited owing to certain limiting adjuncts such as jars and other vessels'.¹ Sri Madhva's explanation of this division of space by jars, etc. is quite ingenious. He says that jars etc. are said to be in contact with a portion more prominent. It does not create a new portion. Similarly in every case where the upādhi functions, it merely makes the difference, which already exists there, quite patent. It does not create differences anew.

Then Madhvācārya proceeds to disprove the theory that upādhis create differences anew.

Text: नचेदुपाधिसम्बन्ध एकदेशेऽयं सर्वगः ।
एकदेशेऽनवस्था स्यात् सर्वगश्चेन्न भेदकः ।

Translation: If the upādhi is not accepted as merely an indicator of a difference that already existed but as the producer of a new difference, then the question arises 'Is the upādhi in contact with a part of space or with space as a whole? In the first case there will be the defect anavasthā; in the second, (since the upādhi is coextensive with space) no division (difference) is created.'

Explanation: Madhvācārya here examines the validity of the illustration furnished by the Advaitins to ex-

1. पर एवात्मा देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्ध्युपाधिभिः
परिच्छिद्यमानो बाह्यैः शरीर इत्युपचर्यते
यथा घटकरकापदुपाधिवशादपरिच्छिद्यमानमपि
नमः परिच्छिद्यवत् अवमासते

Sāṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra I.2.6

plain the function of upādhis. Sri Madhva argues: 'There are only two alternatives possible for the upādhi to be in contact with space. Either the upādhi is in touch with a portion of space; or it is in contact with the totality of space. If upādhi is stated to be in contact with some part of space, it means that there is a division into parts prior to the contact. Without a prior upādhi no division can take place. This would go on without any end. There would be anavasthā. If the upādhi is in contact with space as a whole there is no possibility of a division at all. Thus both the alternatives are inadmissible. The same point is discussed in greater detail in the Viṣṇu-tattvanirṇaya, by Sri Madhva pointing out other fallacies in the argument. He observes,

उपाधिकृतांशकल्पने तदुपाधिकृतत्वे आत्माश्रयत्वम् ।
उपाध्यन्तरकल्पने अनवस्था

If it is held that upādhi is the cause of division of Brahman into plurality of individual souls there occurs the fault of ātmāśrayatva, for upādhi is said to be in contact with a portion created by itself. If another upādhi is supposed to operate, then there would be anavasthā. There is a further point raised,

किंचोपाधिरात्मन एकदेशं ग्रसति उत सर्वात्मनाम् ।
एकदेशांगीकारे सावयवत्वम् । सावयवस्य च
अनित्यत्वम् । सर्वग्रासे च नोपाधिर्भेदकः स्यात् ।

'If the upādhi is said to affect only a part of the Supreme Soul, it means that the Supreme Soul consists of parts and anything that consists of parts is held to be not eternal (destructible) and that is contradictory to the nature of Brahman. If the upādhi

is said to be in contact with the whole of Brahman, then there is no possibility of any division into parts. Thus the alternatives being rejected, it follows that the opponent's proposition that the upādhi creates difference de novo, becomes untenable.

Then Sri Madhva examines the Advaitin's stand that there is no difference between one individual soul and another, all being really Brahman.

Text: सुखदुःखादिभोगश्च स्वरूपक्ये न भेदतः ।
दृश्योह्युपाधिभेदेऽपि हस्तपादादिगो यथा ॥

Translation: If there were identity between one soul and another, the experience of pleasure and pain would not have been different in the case of each individual. Even in spite of the difference brought about by upādhis such as hands, feet etc. the experience of joy or sorrow through them is not felt to be different by the individual but felt as his own. Similarly in spite of the difference of the bodies, all individuals must have had simultaneous experience of joy or sorrow.

Explanation: Leaving aside the fault in the analogy, Sri Madhva examines the propositions of the identity of souls. The Advaitins do not admit that the individual souls are essentially different. They resort to the theory of upādhis to explain the diversity of experience (उपाधिनिमित्तोऽयमात्मभेदः स्वतस्त्वेकात्म्यमेव). This view, known as ओपाधिकभेद among souls, is the target of attack in this verse. The argument is more clearly stated in the following passage from Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya:

उपाधिभेदांगीकारे हस्तपादाद्युपाधिभेदेऽपि
तद्गतसुखादिभोक्तुर्यथा भेदो न प्रतीयते
एवमेव शरीरादिभेदेऽपि भोक्तुर्भेदो न दृश्येत ।
सर्वदेहगतसुखदुःखादिकं एकेनैव भुज्येत ॥

'If the difference between (among) the souls is not intrinsic but merely due to the upādhis, then, just as, in spite of the difference caused by the upādhis such as hands and feet, a person feels the experience of joy and sorrow, engendered in them, as his own, so also, a person should simultaneously experience the joys and sorrows of other persons, even though the bodies are different.

Nowhere do we possess any evidence to the effect that one person is able to experience the same joys and sorrows that others experience. Hence we are to conclude that the individual souls are different and each has a unique experience of his own.

Jayatirtha while explaining this verse employs a term, viz. अनुसन्धान. He defines अनुसन्धान as स्वीकृत्यानुभव-मात्रं i.e. अनुसन्धान is the realisation by an individual of his experience as his own. This subjective realisation of an individual is peculiar to him; it is not experienced by any other individual. The individual's experience is cited here to show that upādhis do not make any difference. Notwithstanding the difference caused by the upādhi such as hands and feet, the individual realises the various experiences as his own.

So upādhis do not cause difference. Or in other words difference is intrinsic and not due to adventitious circumstances (upādhis).

Text: नानादेहभोगानुसन्धानं योगिनो यथा ।
नचेद् भोगानुसन्धानं तदिच्छा भोगिनः कुतः ।

Translation: Also as in the case of a yogi who takes up various bodies in different lives in order to undergo particular kind of experience. If it were not so how can a yogi's desire to inhabit a particular kind of body be explained?

Explanation: Śrī Madhva mentions here the case of a yogi as an illustration in support of the view that in spite of the difference in upādhis, the souls, if identical, will experience the pain and pleasure experienced by other souls. For example, a yogi who can remember experiencing particular kind of pleasure and pain (in order to exhaust his karma) takes up particular kinds of bodies as required. This is made possible on account of the identity of soul (svarūpaikya) of the yogi. The yogi is able to remember his past lives and plan his future lives. Similarly if all the souls were to have (savarūpaikya) identity, each soul should be able to experience the joys and sorrows of other souls. As this is not the case, argues Śrī Madhva, the identity of souls is a myth. There is intrinsic difference, svarūpabheda between one soul and another.

In the next verse the difference between the yogi's soul and that of an ordinary person is pointed out:

Text: अनुसन्धानरहितदेहबाहुल्यमन्यथा ।
सिद्धमेव हि तत्पक्षे विशेषो योगिनः कुतः ॥

Translation: If it is argued that acquisition of different bodies in different births by a particular soul

is possible even otherwise (than by pre-planning) then there will not be any difference between the acquisition of various bodies by a particular soul, and that in the case of a yogi. (But Purāṇas assert that there is such a difference).

Explanation: The verse discusses the contention that the acquisition of different bodies is possible even without previous planning (anusandhāna). It is admitted on all hands that souls take up different bodies according to the accumulated merit (sañcitakarma). So anusandhāna is not necessary at all. Śrī Madhva answers this objection by pointing out that there is a fundamental difference between a yogi's soul acquiring different bodies and the soul of an ordinary human being taking up a body. In the case of the soul of an ordinary being there is no choice at all in the acquisition of bodies, whereas a yogi's soul can choose to reside in any kind of body he desires. Purāṇas cite instances of a yogi's soul entering the body of even lower creatures.

A note on anusandhāna: Anusandhānam means planning, anu + sañ + dhā — Bhāve (yuj) arranging, getting ready, suitable connection. Śrī Madhva uses this word in this sense only. But his commentator Jayatīrtha gives another interpretation. He takes the word to mean 'the realisation, of one's experiences as one's own (svīyatayā anubhavamātram). The first meaning, however, is better suited to the context than the one given by Jayatīrtha.

Even granting the opponent's contention that the Karma theory can explain the acquisition of different bodies in different births by a soul, Śrī Madhva

points out in the next verse, that karma theory by itself does not satisfactorily explain it.

Text: सिद्धौ हि कर्मभेदस्य स्यादुपाधिविभिन्नता ।
तत्सिद्धौ चैव तत्सिद्धिरित्यन्योन्यव्यपाश्रयः ॥

Translation: If it is argued that the difference in the upādhis is the result of the difference in the karma of each individual, then for the difference in karma, there will have to be a difference in upādhis. This means there is the fallacy of interdependence in the argument.

Explanation: There is the view, generally held, that the karma of each individual is responsible for the particular kind of body a soul acquires in a birth. It is also equally true that it is the difference in the bodies that brings about the difference in karma. Thus there occurs the fault of vicious reciprocity (anyonyāśrayadoṣa). As an illustration of this kind of fallacy we can cite the instance of the proposition that the seed is the cause of the tree. But the seed comes into existence only when there is the tree. Thus the tree becomes the cause of the seed. There is mutual interdependence as cause and effect. Therefore the statement, "The seed is the cause of the tree" is said to be faulty on account of the fallacy of mutual reciprocity (anyonyāśrayadoṣa). Therefore Śri Madhva contends that the concept of karma alone does not solve the problem as to how the difference in upādhis is brought about.

Hence Śri Madhva postulated the theory that there is a radical difference between one soul and ano-

ther and also between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul.

Text: आत्मस्वभावभेदस्य निर्दोषत्वेन चाखिलः ।
प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधाच्च दृष्टः पक्षोऽयमत्र जसा ॥

Translation: There will be no fallacy in the argument if it is supposed that there is intrinsic difference between one soul and another. Further the opponent's theory (theory of identity) is opposed to perception and the other valid means of knowledge. Hence it is undoubtedly faulty.

Explanation: Śri Madhva here points out the relative merit of his theory of difference when compared with the theory of identity propounded by the Advaitins. It is Madhva's firm conviction that any knowledge obtained by right perception cannot be invalidated except by still more accurate sensuous perception. He holds that senses of normal men under normal circumstances are perfectly reliable न च प्रत्यक्षदृष्टस्य ततोऽपि बलवत्त्वमस्ति विना बाधोदृष्टः. Therefore the theory of identity of souls which is contradicted by experience is not a sound theory. His own theory of five-fold difference, on the other hand, has the support of everyday facts of experience.

Text: त्रेष्टालिङ्गेन सात्मत्वे परदेहस्य साधिते ।
अन्यत्वं स्वात्मनस्तस्मात् सर्वैरेवानुभूयते ॥

Translation: Noting the characteristic activities of the individuals surrounding him, a person comes to the conclusion that they too possess a soul like his own;

then realises that he is different from them. This is the experience of each and every one of us.

Explanation: A person comes into contact with many persons like himself. They are engaged in various activities like himself. On the basis of their activity he infers that they are also individuals like himself possessing a soul. He also observes that in all matters they act differently. Therefore he comes to the conclusion that they are different from him. When such is the fact regarding individuals, the assumption that all souls are identical has no basis.

Similar is the case with regard to the assumption that the Supreme Soul and the individual soul are identical. The reason is given in the next verse. Their differences in qualities are enumerated.

Text: अज्ञताचाल्यशालित्वं दुःखित्वं स्वल्पकर्तृता ।
सर्वज्ञत्वादीशगुणविरुद्धा ह्यनुभूतिगाः ॥

Translation: The qualities of the individual soul such as ignorance, limited power, misery and limited capability are quite opposed to the qualities of the Supreme Being such as omniscience and so on. The realisation of this contrast is experienced by all.

Explanation: Here Śrī Madhva dwells upon the difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul in their characteristics. He mentions certain prominent characteristics of the individual soul which are directly opposed to those of the Supreme Soul. It does not mean that there are no characteristics which are common to both. Śrī Madhva concedes that there are points of similarity between the Jīva

and the Brahman. The soul of man also possesses characteristics such as reality, consciousness and bliss (sat, cit, ānanda). There is affinity between the two. The freed soul is very much akin to God. But here he is speaking of a soul immersed in saṁsāra whose real characteristics are clouded by such defects as ignorance, incapacity, misery, etc. At every step in his worldly dealings, a person's imperfection is brought home to him. On account of his ignorance and miscalculations many of his plans go wrong. This can never be the case with the Supreme Being, who is admitted on all hands to be omniscient. An individual faces adverse circumstances and many a time finds himself unable to face them. His ability is limited as contrasted with the omnipotent nature of the Supreme Being. Misery is the common lot of worldly individuals. There may be happiness for a short time but it is not lasting and permanent. The Supreme Soul on the other hand is characterised by eternal bliss. An individual is not a free agent, free to pursue any activity that pleases him. He is a dependent being. The Supreme Being is the only independent being. From such a marked contrast between the Jīva and the Brahman, the only legitimate conclusion is that the Jīva is different from the Brahman. But at the same time Madhvācārya says that they are not irreconcilably opposed to each other "परं तु न जीवो ब्रह्मणो घट इव पटात् अत्यन्तभिन्नः तथात्वेऽभेदश्रुतयः उपरुध्येन्" explains Jayatīrtha in his Nyāyasudhā.

Next Madhvācārya quotes relevant Śruti texts in support of his statements that the Supreme Being possesses the qualities, omniscience, etc.

Text: सार्वज्ञादिगुणा विष्णोः श्रुतिषु प्रतिपादिताः ।
 'सत्यः सो अस्य महिमा' इत्यादि वाक्यान्मृषा न च ॥

Translation: The qualities, omniscience, etc. of God Viṣṇu are expounded in the Śruti. There again, the statement, 'The greatness of the Supreme Being is true' is also found. On account of such a statement the qualities mentioned cannot be false.

Explanation: Madhvācārya asserts that we can learn anything about God or His characteristics only from the Śruti. So he quotes such passages from the sacred scriptures as are relevant to the context. In the verse under discussion, the passage सत्यः सो अस्य महिमा is taken from Rgveda ¹. In the third hymn of the eighth Maṇḍala, there is a passage which runs thus:

अयं सहस्रमृषिभिः सहस्रकृतः समुद्र इव पप्रथे ।
 सत्यः सो अस्य महिमा गूणे शवो यज्ञेषु विप्रराज्ये ॥

The passage eulogises Indra and speaks of his greatness as true. But it is Śrī Madhva's conviction that the scriptures eulogise only Viṣṇu as is asserted in the passage,

वेदे रामायणे चैव etc.

So whether the Śruti speaks of Indra or any other God, they mean only the Supreme Being, Viṣṇu.

Text: न च वेदोक्तमिथ्यात्वे मानं तन्मानतापि न ।
 अतोऽज्ञासंभवादेव नाधिकार्यैकवादिनाम् ॥

Translation: There is no reliable authority which declares that what is said in the Vedas is false. If at

1. Rgveda VIII. 3-4.

all there is such an authority which contradicts the truth of the statements in the Vedas (relating to the omniscience of the Supreme Being and His other qualities) it has to be ignored. Still if the Advaitin persists in his theory of identity, etc. the result would be that there would be no person who is ignorant and consequently, no person who is in need of the study of the Vedas—no adhikārī.

Explanation: There is the possibility of an objection, namely, that everything that is said in the Veda need not be true. In answer to such an objection Śrī Madhva asserts that there is no authority which says that the statements in the Vedas are false. All statements in the Veda are valid and true. The other Pramāṇas, Perception, Inference, etc. establish only the difference between the Supreme Being and the individual soul. Taking, therefore, the texts of the Śruti as valid, there are many passages that emphasise the greatness of the Supreme Being, His omniscience and other characteristics. If there are contradictory statements in the Śruti, they are either to be ignored or interpreted in such a manner as to harmonize with the other statements.

Śrī Madhva then points out an undesirable result that might follow if the identity of the Supreme Being is omniscient. There would be no one who is ignorant and in need of Vedic studies.

Text: अतो नाज्ञानमित च विषयो विषयान्तरे ।
 अज्ञाभावात् फलं कस्य योगः शशनृशृंगयोः ॥

Translation: Further, (as a consequence of the theory of identity) there will be nothing which can be said

to be unknown. That means the śāstras will have no viṣaya to deal with. Since there is no ignorant person who is there to benefit by Vedic study? The connection between the adhikārī, the viṣaya and the prayojana of a śāstra would be similar to the imaginary connection between a hare and horns or a man and horns.

Explanation: For a metaphysical treatise there must always be an adhikārī, a viṣaya and a prayojana and the three must be closely connected with one another. Then only will the treatise have any usefulness. The Advaitin's theory of identity nullifies everything as pointed out in his argument. Whereas if the doctrine of difference is admitted, all becomes meaningful. There will be an ignorant spiritual aspirant who wants to know more about the Supreme Being and would undertake the study of the Vedas and reap the benefit. Thus there will be usefulness in studying the Vedas.

Text: दुर्घटत्वं भूषणं चेत्स्यादविद्यात्वमात्मनः ।
अन्धतमोऽप्यलंकारो नित्यदुःखं शिरोमणिः ॥

Translation: If incompatibility be considered an ornament then let there be ignorance on the part of the Ātman (Supreme Being); let utter ignorance be also an ornament and eternal misery a crest-jewel to that Being.

Explanation: Not being able to explain properly how avidyā can coexist with Brahman the Advaitins try to escape by giving such dogmatical statements as

दुर्घटत्वमविद्याया भूषणं न तु दूषणम् ॥

It is in answer to such dogmatic assertions that Madhvācārya makes such remarks as given in the above verse. Such incongruities occur only when the theory of identity is insisted upon. On the other hand if the Jiva and the Brahman are considered as two entities essentially different, no such incongruities occur. So the theory of difference is the most sound theory.

Text: अतः परोमात्रयेतिपूर्वश्रुतिनिर्दिष्टः ।
अन्यमीशमिति श्रुत्या भिन्नजीवदृशं गतः ॥
भिन्नत्वेनात्मसादृश्यदोषदेति श्रुतेः सदा ।

Translation: Therefore it is that the greatness of Viṣṇu is pointed out in the passage of Rgveda, 'beyond limits' etc. The words of the Śruti, 'the other Lord' etc. state how the Supreme Being is seen as another by the Jiva. Again the words of the Śruti, 'bestowing a state similar to itself' show how the individual soul is different from the Supreme Soul.

Explanation: Sri Madhva quotes appropriate passages from the Śruti which support his views that the Supreme Being, Viṣṇu is the greatest being, that He is different from the Jiva and that in the state of mokṣa, the Jiva attains a state similar to that of Viṣṇu but does not become one with Him as the Advaitins contend. The first passage is,

परो मात्रया तन्वा वृधान
न ते महित्वमन्वशुवन्ति Rgveda VIII. 99.4

This is a passage praising Viṣṇu. The passage means, 'O Lord, it was not possible for any one to know your greatness, when you expanded your body beyond

limits'. The passage is quoted to support the view that Viṣṇu is greater than all other beings. The second passage is from the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad. (III. 1.2)

समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो निमग्नोऽ

नीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः ।

जुष्टं यदा पश्यति अन्यमीशं

अस्य महिमानमिति वीतशोकः ॥

'On the same tree the individual soul remains stuck as it were and it moans being worried by its impotence. When it sees thus the other, the adored Lord, and his glory, then it becomes liberated from sorrow.'

Here Śrī Madhva wants everybody to note the phrase which speaks of the Supreme Being as different from the embodied soul which is ever bemoaning its fate.

The third passage is also from Muṇḍaka.

यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णं

कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम्

तदा विद्वान् पुण्य पापे विधूय

निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ॥

When the seer sees the Puruṣa, the golden-coloured creator, the Lord, and the source of the individual Ātman, then the enlightened one completely shakes off both virtue and vice, becomes free from suffering and attains the closest similarity with the Supreme Being. The verse states how the individual soul attains a state which is similar to that of the Supreme Being. The phrase 'paramaṁ sāmyaṁ' is emphasised by Śrī Madhva and he insists that Viṣṇu bestows only a state

similar to his own (sādṛśyatā) on his devotee. Madhvācārya, therefore, contends that even after attaining mokṣa, the individual soul does not merge in the Supreme soul but remains distinct.

Text: मायावादतमोव्याप्तमिति तत्त्वदृशा जगत्

भातं सर्वज्ञसूर्येण प्रीतये श्रीपतेः सदा ॥

Translation: Thus, in order to please for ever the Lord of Lakṣmī the sun of omniscience has illumined this world where the darkness of Māyāvāda has spread, by virtue of his capacity to see the truth.

It is probable that this verse which is a eulogy of Madhva was added by some admirer of Madhvācārya.

Text: नमोऽमन्दनिजानन्दसान्द्रमुन्दरमूर्तये ।

इदिरापतये नित्यानन्दभोजनदायिने ॥

Translation: I bow to that Lord of Lakṣmī, who possesses a beautiful form, characterised by excessive bliss and who bestows permanent enjoyment of happiness on his devotees.

Śrī Madhva here bows to Lord Viṣṇu, after having successfully completed his work.

MĀYĀVĀDAKHAṆḌANAM

INTRODUCTION

The Māyāvādakhaṇḍanam is a very small treatise, one among the Daśaprakaraṇa, written by Madhvācārya to show that the interpretation of the Śruti texts is unsatisfactory and inconsistent. He shows by argument that identity between the finite soul and the Supreme Soul is illogical and asserts that Lord Viṣṇu is the Supreme overlord of the universe.

The title of the work is Māyāvādakhaṇḍanam, which means a repudiation of the theory of māyā propounded by the Advaitins. Yet the fundamental principle of the Absolutists, viz. the Brahmaikya is the main target of attack in this work. He reiterates his view, already discussed in detail in the Upādhikhaṇḍanam, that the superimposition of avidyā on Brahman is indefensible and unreasonable. By means of a lengthy quotation from the Gītā which speaks about the perishable being, the nonperishable being and the Transcendental Being, Madhvācārya seems to suggest that these declarations coming from Lord Kṛṣṇa himself are enough to scatter to the winds the absolutists' pet theory of illusion.

The Māyāvāda or the theory of illusion, assumed by the Advāita philosophers, briefly put, states that this world of names and forms, is unreal and that the only reality is Brahman. The world is said to be unreal since it is sublated by true knowledge. The objects of the world are changeable. Nothing that

changes is real. Real is that which is eternal. In that sense Brahman alone is real.

Our knowledge enables us only to explain the relation between the objects of this world. But it is impossible to explain how the finite world issued out of the infinite Brahman, just as we are unable to explain how a tree is produced by a magician from a mere seed. It is this kind of inexplicability that is denoted by the word māyā. Māyā is so called because it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not.

Though Madhvācārya does not comment upon these interpretations of the term māyā in the Māyāvādakhaṇḍanam, he touches upon this topic in his Tatvodyota and Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya. He holds the view that the theory of illusion is not supported by any Pramāṇa. The objects of this world which exist and endure can never be struck off as unreal and illusory. Partially admitting this fact the Advaitins have tried to compromise their theory of illusion. They attribute a lower degree of reality to the world and a higher degree of reality to Brahman, calling the one Vyāvahārika satyam and the other Pāramārthika satyam, empirical reality and absolute reality. Madhva is not prepared to concede even this. He maintains that the reality of the phenomenal world is of the same degree or order as the reality of Brahman. He denies the existence of a category, Sadasadvilakṣaṇa (neither Sat nor Asat).

Summary of the argument in Māyāvādakhaṇḍanam.

He begins the discussion by stating that a study of the Sāstra need not be undertaken, for it gives

us a wrong idea of the state of things. The identity of the Brahman and Ātman which is the fundamental principle of the Advaitins cannot be maintained even according to their own theories. If this identity is one with the Brahman, an intrinsic characteristic of Brahman, it would be revealed by itself as is the case with Brahman which is self-luminous. It does not require a śāstra or a Pramāṇa to reveal it to the ignorant. If it were anything other than Brahman, then Advaitism does not exist; there will only be Dualism. Then the texts advocating Advaitism would be giving false information. Thus in any case the study of the Śāstras would be useless. There would be no justification for a study of the Śāstras. It is on the authority of the scriptural texts that any system of philosophy should take its stand. When these very texts are rendered meaningless then the system itself stands discredited. So no system-builder would countenance such a contingency. Hence Sri Madhva points out the absurd result that would follow if the theory of identity is insisted upon. One more point, stressed by Sri Madhva in support of his contention that the scriptural texts would be rendered meaningless by the theory of identity, is the following: People have recourse to a study of scriptural texts when they want to know more about Brahman in addition to their meagre knowledge and they expect a good deal of information from these texts. The Advaitins say that Brahman is without attributes (Nirviśeṣa) and hence there is nothing to know about the characteristics of Brahman and consequently the study of the texts would be a fruitless undertaking. It is the accepted doctrine of the Advaitin that a Pramāṇa should reveal something new. As there is nothing new to reveal,

the texts lose their value as a Pramāṇa. Further, an account of the impossibility of ignorance on the part of Jivātman, it being identical with the Brahman, there is nothing to be known and there is no need of any philosophy or metaphysics. Advaitism thus stands repudiated. If, on the other hand, identity is not true, then the theory of Bheda becomes true. Viewed in whatever way, the theory of identity involves inconsistencies. Even then their Śāstra becomes futile. Śāstras are studied for acquiring knowledge and finally to attain salvation. When identity is insisted upon, the realisation of oneness being already there, the state of mokṣa is also there and no more is desired. Viewed from this point also, the study of the Vedas becomes unnecessary. The argument of the absence of Adhikārī, Viśaya, Prayojana, and Sambandha the four-fold essential characteristics of a metaphysical treatise, is repeated here also. Then Madhva quotes five verses from the Gītā beginning with द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके etc., two verses from the Kāṭhakoṇiṣad and a Sūtra from Brahmasūtras, all in support of the doctrine that Viṣṇu is the Supreme Being, higher than all, and that He possesses infinite attributes; and then he concludes that in this manner the Lord Himself as well as the scriptures proclaim the unequalled superiority of Lord Viṣṇu.

मायावादखण्डनम्

MĀYĀVĀDAKHAṆḌANAM

As usual Śrī Madhva begins the work with a verse in praise of Lord Narasimha.

Text: नरसिंहोऽखिलाज्ञानमतध्वान्तदिवाकरः ।
जयत्यमितसज्ज्ञानमुखशक्तिपयोनिधिः ॥

Translation: That Lord Narasimha reigns supreme, who is like the sun in the matter of dispelling the darkness (ignorance) caused by the opinions of ignorant persons, and who is like the vast ocean of right knowledge, unalloyed bliss, and unimpeded power.

Explanation: By the term *ajñānamatam* is meant *ajñānakalpitaṁ matam* i. e. opinion formed due to ignorance. The reference here is to the wrong notion that the Brahman and the Ātman are identical. In the epithet *satjñānasukhaśakti* the term *sat* is to be combined with *jñāna*, *sukha* and *śakti*. Then *sajñāna* means right knowledge; *satsukham* means *duḥkhāsammiśram*, i. e. happiness unmixed with misery; *sacchakti* means *apratihataśakti*, i. e. power which is unobstructed. The term *amitam* qualifies these three qualities as well as *payo-nidhi* and emphasises the unlimited nature of the qualities as well as the vastness of the ocean and implies the limitlessness of these qualities in the Lord, who is praised here; for, He alone, by His grace is capable of removing the ignorance of all persons.

Mayāvādakhaṇḍanam

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cf. अज्ञानां ज्ञानदो विष्णुर्ज्ञानिनां मोक्षदश्च सः ।
आनन्ददश्च मुक्तानां स एवैको जनादनः ॥

—Anuvyākhyāna

Text: विमतमनारम्भणीयम् । अन्यथाप्रतिपादकत्वात् ।
यदित्यं तत्तथा । यथा सम्प्रतिपन्नम् ॥

Translation: The Śāstra which gives controversial views (regarding the real nature of the Supreme Being) need not be studied; for, it gives a false view (of the real state of affairs). Whatever gives false views is not to be studied. The śāstra accepted by them (our opponents) is of that sort. (Therefore it is not to be studied).

Explanation: Śrī Madhvācārya commences the discussion by first taking up the question of the study of the Śāstra. The expression *विमतमनारम्भणीयम्* means *आरम्भणीयत्वानारम्भणीत्वान्यां विमतिविषयीभूतं शास्त्रं अनारम्भणीयम्* ॥
— (Jayatīrtha)

That Śāstra, the study of which has become a subject of controversy some contending that it should be studied while others vehemently opposing it, is not to be taken up for study. This forms the *Pratijñā-vākya* of the syllogism in which *anyathā pratipādakatvād* is the statement of the *hetu*; *yadittham tat tathā* is the *vyāpti* and *yatha sampratipannam* is the *udāharana*. The *Nigamana* namely *tasmāt tathā* is omitted here. Madhvācārya usually omits the *nigamana* in his syllogisms for he thinks that it is superfluous. The *hetu* or the reason given for arriving at the conclusion *Vimatam anārambhāṇīyam* is that the Śāstra

gives an erroneous idea of the state of affairs. The Advaitins interpret the Vedic statements in a wrong way; for, they explain it as expounding the identity of Jivātman and Paramātman. The brief statement yadittham tat tathā means that whichever Śāstra gives erroneous views is not worth studying. The expression, yathā sampratipannam which constitutes the statement of illustration, means 'as is the Śāstra advocating the theory of identification of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul, and its merging into the latter after mokṣa'. The syllogism when rendered into English will read thus:

The Śāstra giving controversial views is not worth studying.

Because it gives erroneous views.

Any Śāstra that gives erroneous views is not worth studying.

As is the Śāstra accepted by the Advaitins [in which the theory of identification and merging of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul is propounded.]

It may be asked why Śrī Madhva speaks of the necessity or otherwise of the study of the Śāstrā when dealing with Māyāvāda of the Advaitins. The answer is this. A man's ultimate aim in life is to get release from the cycle of birth and death, to be freed from the miseries of life. For achieving this aim, God's grace is essential. His grace can be secured only by worship and prayer. Worship becomes fruitful when we realise the real nature of the Supreme Being. The Śruti and Smṛti texts which proclaim the

purpose. In his opinion, the finite individual himself is Brahman, the Supreme Being. The identity is obscured because of ignorance, and can be realised when this ignorance is removed by the study of the texts which proclaim this identity.

It is to emphasise the utter futility of studying such texts that proclaim the identity of Ātman and Brahman, that the discussion is started. Śrī Madhva seeks to prove that the interpretation of the texts by the Advaitins is wrong. A General reason for rejecting the Advaitin's position is first given. It is that it conveys an entirely erroneous and false view of the real state of affairs. The erroneous view is the identity between the Supreme Being and the finite individual soul.

Text: नहिब्रह्मैक्यस्य यावार्थं तत्त्वज्ञे ।
ब्रह्मतद्धानेः स्वस्वातिरेके ॥

Translation: The identity of Ātman with Brahman is not a reality according to the Advaitins (according to whom only Brahman is real; every other thing is unreal); for, if they accept aikyam as some real thing other than Brahman, it would be suicidal to the theory of Monism.

Explanation: Madhva adduces an argument to prove that the theory of identity is false. He asserts that aikyam cannot be real even according to the Absolutists. It is their fundamental doctrine that Brahman alone is real. Then, how can they in the same breath assert that aikyam also is real? As aikyam cannot be admitted by the Advaitin to be reality; for, ac-

according to them Brahman alone is real; therefore aikyam will have to be considered as something unreal; and consequently the texts which proclaim aikyam would be misleading. Therefore they would not be worthy of being seriously studied.

Sri Madhva argues further. He states that there can be two alternatives for the existence of aikyam. Either aikyam must be different from Brahman or it must be the very nature of Brahman. Supposing it is different from Brahman, then it means that there is a reality, as real as Brahman itself and at the same time different from it. There are thus two realities not one. This would mean there is no Monism but only Dualism. The Advaitin will never allow such a contingency to occur.

Text: अनतिरेके स्वप्रकाशत्वात् आत्मनः सिद्धसाधनता

Translation: If oneness (aikyam) is not different from Brahman but its own nature, then since Brahman is self-luminous, aikyam becomes self-established and requires no outside agencies like the Śāstras to prove its existence.

Explanation: Sri Madhva considers the second alternative, namely that aikyam is identical with the Brahman and possesses its characteristics. Then it follows that it possesses the quality of self-luminosity (sva-prakāśatva) which is a characteristic of Brahman. If aikyam is self-luminous by nature, it does not require an outside agency to make it known. The śāstras which proclaim this aikyam are not at all necessary. The Vedas are considered the sole authority by means

of which knowledge of the relation between Brahman and Ātman, etc., are known. These very Vedas are rendered superfluous by the position taken up by the Advaitins. For this reason also the Vedic texts need not be studied.

The above argument of Sri Madhva presenting a disjunctive proposition and proving both the alternatives untenable, is one of the many ways employed by logicians to defeat their adversary. In this particular case the proposition itself is not valid. Brahman and aikyam belong to two different categories and to connect these two by the relation, 'is different' or 'is not different' is not logically sound. Brahman is a concrete entity having a reality whereas aikyam is merely a notion, a concept in the mind of the thinker, having no real existence outside the mind. Therefore to say Brahman is aikyam or Brahman is not aikyam is not a correct judgement of facts.

Text: निर्विशेषत्वादात्मनः नानधिगतो विशेषः

Translation: The Ātman being devoid of all attribute, (according to the Advaita doctrine) there is no question of the attributes being not understood at any time.

Explanation: To justify the need of studying the texts the Advaitin says that the śāstras help the aspirants who has only a vague knowledge of Brahman, to have a fuller knowledge of it. It is to refute this argument that Madhvācārya brings forward the above contention. He asserts that the argument is pointless for, Brahman is attributeless according to the Advaita

view. So the question of better understanding of the attributes of the Pure Being with the help of the śāstras does not arise at all. The familiar example of the cognition of a jar given by the Advaitin is not applicable in this case. In the case of the jar it is possible that one may be aware of it only vaguely at first, but after a closer observation, becomes fully aware of all its attributes. This is because the jar is a thing possessing attributes. But Brahman is attributeless and therefore the example is not applicable here. The progressive knowledge of its attributes is meaningless, there being nothing to be known about an attributeless Brahman. For this reason also the study of the śāstras becomes useless.

Text: सिद्धत्वात् स्वरूपस्य विशेषाभावाच्च तान्नानं
कस्यचिदावरकम् ।

Translation: The essential nature of Brahman being already known (as it is self-luminous) and as there are no special attributes of Brahman (being attributeless) ignorance would hide nothing (as there is nothing to hide).

Explanation: Another justification for the study of the śāstras as urged by the Advaitin is that the study of the śāstras helps to destroy the veil of ignorance and enable a person to realise the true nature of the Brahman. Ignorance is an obstruction to Realisation. Madhvācārya meets this contention with the following argument. The veil of ignorance can function only when there is something to hide with regard to Brahman. The essential nature of Brahman cannot be hidden for Brahman is self-luminous. Also

Brahman does not possess any special attribute which can be hidden for it is attributeless. Hence there is nothing to be hidden by the veil of ignorance and hence also no justification for its function. Thus the assumption, that the veil of ignorance obscures the realisation of Brahman and has to be destroyed by the study of the śāstras, is baseless.

Text: अनविगतार्थगन्तृप्रमाणमिति तन्मतम् ।

Translation: It is the accepted principle of the Advaitin that a Pramāṇa is that which reveals something new, something not known before.

Explanation: Madhvācārya adduces here another argument to show that śāstras lose their importance as a Pramāṇa if the Advaitin's views are accepted. In matters of Logic, the Advaitins follow the same principles as the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas (vyavahāre Bhāṭṭanaya). The Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas define Pramāṇa as that which reveals something which is not known before. Viewed from this standpoint the śāstras lose their importance as a Pramāṇa. For Brahman is Pure Being possessing no characteristics at all. So there is nothing for the śāstras to reveal about Brahman. They may even be considered as giving false information. Hence Madhvācārya's contention 'anyathā pratipāḍakatvād'.

Text: अज्ञानासम्भवादेव तन्मतमखिलमपाकृतम्

Translation: On account of the impossibility of the Jīvātman being ignorant (as the result of his identity with the omniscient Brahman) all his arguments stand repudiated.

Explanation: Madhvācārya here directs his attention to the theory of ignorance propounded by the Advaitin. The Advaitin contends that the Jivātman is enveloped by a veil of ignorance. This is impossible for, by their own admission, Jivātman is identical with the Paramātman who is omniscient. Ignorance and omniscience together cannot reside in the same substratum. Jivātman must be as omniscient as the Paramātman. Otherwise identity loses its significance. When there is no ignorance in the world where is the necessity for the study of the śāstras? That means all philosophical and metaphysical treatises become useless. Nobody would like to countenance such a state of affairs.

Text: मिथ्यात्वेचैक्यस्यातत्त्वावेदकत्वमागमस्य स्यात्

Translation: If the identity (of Brahman and Ātman) is admitted to be false (by the Advaitin) all those scriptural texts, which speak of this identity, would be giving only false information.

Explanation: Madhvācārya points out here the consequences of admitting that identity is false. The Advaitin's basic principle of philosophy is that Brahman and Ātman are identical. Once he admits that this identity is false, those texts, on which he relies, would lose their authority as valid testimony; for the information they give regarding the relation between Brahman and Ātman would turn out to be false.

Text: सत्यता च भेदस्य

Translation: (If identity is admitted to be false) then (its opposite) difference becomes true.

Explanation: Another consequence of admitting that identity is false, is pointed out here. Identity and difference are contradictories. If one of them is false, then the other is naturally true. So if identity is admitted to be false then difference, its contradictory, becomes true. This is something suicidal on the part of the Advaitin.

Text: एवमेव प्रयोजनमपि निरस्तम्
स्वरूपत्वात् मोक्षस्य, पूर्वमेव सिद्धत्वात्

Translation: Similarly, there results the absence of utility in studying the śāstras; for mokṣa is already there, being the essential nature of Ātman which is identical with the Paramātman.

Explanation: The Advaitins contend that the study of the śāstras is necessary for leading a person to salvation. But by their own admission of the identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul, mokṣa which is the very nature of the Supreme Soul must also reside in Ātman as its natural characteristic and there is no need to seek mokṣa and labour for it by studying the śāstras. So here is no benefit to be derived from the study of the śāstras.

Text: अज्ञानासम्भवेन चतुर्थप्रकाराभावात्पञ्चमप्रकारतापि निरस्ता

Translation: On account of the absence of ignorance, the fourth variety of category cannot be predicated about mokṣa and hence the contention that it belongs to a fifth variety of categories is also untenable.

Explanation: The four categories of existing things, as admitted by the Advaitin, are sat, asat, sadasat, and

anirvacanīya. According to the Advaitin a thing is said to belong to the category of sat (that which always exists) when it has no beginning or end, e. g. Brahman. A thing is said to be asat when it is characterised by absolute non-existence, e. g. a hare's horn. A thing is said to belong to the category of sadasat when it exists for a time and disappears later, e. g. a pot which existed for a time but which was destroyed later and became non-existent. A thing which cannot be brought under any of the three varieties mentioned above is described as (anirvacanīya) i. e. an indescribable thing, e. g. the illusion of the world. The world, according to the Advaitin, cannot be called 'sat' nor 'asat' nor 'sad-asat'. So he describes it as 'anirvacanīya'.

But according to Madhva and his followers there are only three varieties of existing things namely sat, asat and sadasat. They do not recognise the fourth variety of anirvacanīya things. That thing is said to be sat when a thing exists, e. g. a pot when we cognise it by pratyakṣa. Things like a hare's horn belong to the variety of asat. They are things which never exist. The variety sadasat can be predicated of things like ghaṭa when deśa and kāla are taken into consideration. A particular pot may be existing at a certain time but non-existing at another time. Similarly when a pot is said to exist with respect to a particular place, it is non-existing with respect to a place different from the first. Hence it can be said to belong to the variety 'sad-asat'. All things can be brought under any one of these three varieties, nothing can be called indescribable.

Regarding mokṣa, some hold the view that it cannot be brought under any of the four varieties sat,

asat, sadasat or anirvacanīya and must be taken to belong to a fifth variety. It is this view that Madhvācārya refutes here. According to him there is no fourth variety at all. All things that we experience come under any one of the first three varieties. Therefore, he does not recognise the fifth variety at all. This is just like admitting an eighth variety of taste when there are only six. Madhvācārya does not throw any light on the precise nature of the state of mokṣa except mentioning the nature of activities the released souls may pursue. He quotes a Purāṇa (Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra III. 3.30).

कदाचित् कर्म कुर्वन्ति कदाचिन्नैव कुर्वते
नित्यज्ञानस्वरूपत्वात् नित्यं ध्यायन्ति केशवम् ।
तीर्णतर्तव्यभागा ये प्राप्तानन्दाः परात्मनः
प्रत्यवायस्य बन्धस्याप्यभावात्स्वेच्छया भवेत् ॥ इति ब्रह्माण्डे

Text: विषयप्रयोजनाभावादेवाधिकारी च

तदभावादेव सम्बन्धोऽपि

Translation: As there is no proper subject to be dealt with in a śāstra and as there is absence of utility too, there would be no one in need of its study, and in the absence of all these there will be no proper connection between these.

Explanation: Madhvācārya points out the consequence of the absence of ignorance in the world. Absence of ignorance, of course, results from the supposition that Ātman and Brahman are identical. In the absence of ignorance, not merely will there be absence of adhikāri (a person in need of study of the śāstras) but there would be no proper subject for the metaphysical

treatises; no useful purpose will be served by writing such treatises and so on. In short, metaphysics will be utterly useless. The futility of metaphysical treatises has been mentioned in the Upādhikhaṇḍanam as well and Madhvācārya is repeating the same argument here also.

Text: द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च ।
क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ॥
उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ।
योलोकत्रयमाविश्य विभक्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः ॥
यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहं अक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ॥
अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥

Translation: There are two kinds of beings in the world, the perishable and the imperishable. All the bodies of beings are perishable. He who occupies the highest place is the imperishable being. There is the Supreme Being who is different from these who is called the Highest Self, who prevades the three worlds and sustains them. As I transcend the perishable as well as the imperishable beings, I am known as Highest Puraṣa in the world as well as in the sacred scriptures.

Explanation: Here Madhvācārya quotes passages from the Bhagavad Gītā which speak of the Supreme Being who is different from and superior to the beings of the world. The passage is taken from the 15th chapter of the Gītā. According to Madhva the Kṣarapuruṣa includes all perishable beings from Brahma downwards and Akṣarapuruṣa refers to prakṛti. In his Gītābhāṣya he quotes a smṛti in support of his contention. ¹ Ac-

¹ Smṛti quoted is Śaṅkarācārya Smṛti

ording to him puruṣottama refers to Viṣṇu. Madhvācārya wants to emphasise the superiority of Viṣṇu over all beings. In the last section of the Upādhikhaṇḍanam also he lays emphasis on the superiority of Lord Viṣṇu.

Text: यो मामेवमसंमूढो जानाति पुरुषोत्तमम् ।
स सर्वविद् भजति मां सर्वभावेन भारत ॥
इति गुह्यतमं शास्त्रमिदमुक्तं मयानघ ।
एतद्वुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान् स्यात् कृतकृत्यश्च भारत ।

Translation: Oh descendant of Bharata, he who without delusion knows me as the Supreme Being, comes to know everything and worships me with all his heart. Thus have I imparted to you this most profound teaching so that you may attain the highest intelligence and accomplish all your tasks.

Explanation: This passage (Gītā, chapter XV) is quoted to show the profound nature of the teaching and the fruit a person would reap by understanding them.

Text: इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः ।
मनस्तु परा बुद्धिः बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः ।
महत् परमव्यक्तं अव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः ॥
पुरुषान्नपरं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥

Translation: The sense-objects are higher than the senses, the mind is higher than the sense-objects; the intellect is higher than the mind; the subtle Prakṛti is higher than the intellect and the Supreme Being is higher than the subtle Prakṛti. There is nothing higher than the Supreme Being. He is the culmination and the highest goal.

Explanation: This passage taken from the Kathopanishad describes the grades of the various objects of creation at the top of which comes the Supreme Being. In the ladder of creation the senses form the lowest rung and the Supreme Being the highest. This is according to the Sāṃkhya conception of creation. This passage also is quoted in support of the superiority of the Supreme Being.

Text: भूतः कृतवज्ज्यायस्त्वं तया च दर्शयति

Translation: Meditation on the supreme, characterised by plenitude is pre-eminent as in the case of sacrifices; for, thus the scriptures bear testimony.

Explanation: This is an aphorism taken from the Brahmasūtras.¹ It dwells on the attribute of the Supreme Being called Bhūmatva i. e. abundance. The Supreme Being possesses an infinite number of attributes and is therefore of unquestioned authority. The finite individual soul can never be identical with the Supreme Soul. Hence the theory of identity and that of world illusion are inconsistent. The theory of difference alone, as propounded by Madhvācārya, can satisfactorily explain the relation between individual soul and Supreme Soul, that between the world and the Supreme soul and so on.

Text: इति विष्णोः सर्वोत्तमत्वमेव शास्त्रार्थत्वेन भगवता
श्रुत्या चाभिहितम्

Translation: In this manner the Lord himself as well as the scriptures proclaim the superiority of Viṣṇu only and that is the purpose served by the śāstras.

1. Brahmasūtra III. 3.59-

Text: इतिसर्वज्ञमुनिना मायावादतमोऽखिलम् ।
निरस्तं तत्त्ववादेन सतां संशयनुत्तये ॥

Translation: Thus has the learned sage (Madhvācārya) dispelled the darkness caused by the theory of illusion by adducing arguments in support of the truth about things, with a view to clear the doubts of the virtuous.

Explanation: In this verse the author claims that he has completely refuted the Māyāvāda of the Advaitins. Some critics are of opinion that this stanza was probably inserted later by some admirer of Madhvācārya, as Madhvācārya would not have referred to himself as sarvajñamuni.

Text: नास्ति नारायणसमं न भूतं न भविष्यति ।
एतेन सत्यवाक्येन सर्वार्थान् साधयाम्यहम् ॥

Translation: There is no being equal to Lord Viṣṇu, nor was there one in the past. There will be none in the future too. With this solemn declaration of truth I conclude.

(Here ends the Māyāvādakhaṇḍanam)

Explanation: Madhvācārya concludes his criticism of Māyāvāda with a solemn declaration to the effect that Viṣṇu is Supreme.

प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वानुमानखण्डनम्

PRAPAÑCAMITHYĀTVĀNUMĀNAKHAṆḌANAM

INTRODUCTION

In this small treatise Madhvācārya attempts to prove that the syllogism coined by the Advaitins, to prove that the world is unreal, is not valid. It is a syllogism framed by Śaṅkarācārya while commenting upon the 4th verse of the 2nd chapter of Gauḍapāda Kārikā. The Kārikā is as follows:

अन्तस्थानात् भेदानां तस्माज्जागरिते स्मृतम् ।
यथा तत्र तथा स्वप्ने संवृतत्वेन भिद्यते ॥

This Kārikā states that objects perceived in dreams are illusory on account of their being perceived as real while the dream lasts and later during the waking state found to be false. For the same reason objects perceived in the waking state are also false and illusory for they are sublated when Brahman is realised. The only difference between the objects perceived in dreams and those perceived in the waking state is that the objects perceived in dreams are characterised by limited nature of space. Śaṅkarācārya puts the above arguments in the form of a syllogism: "जाग्रदवस्थायां भावानां वैतथ्यम् । दृश्यत्वात् । यथा तत्र स्वप्ने दृश्यानां भावानां वैतथ्यं तथा जागरितेषु दृश्यत्वविशिष्टम् । तस्मात् जागरितेषु वैतथ्यं स्मृतम् ॥"

The syllogism, which was framed by Śaṅkarācārya to express Gauḍapāda's arguments logically, was subjected to a thorough examination by Madhvācārya and was

found to be faulty in many ways. The fallacies in the argument are pointed out one by one in this small treatise entitled 'Prapañcamithyātvānumānakhaṇḍanam'. The following fallacies are pointed out.

1. आश्रयासिद्धः पक्षः
2. अप्रसिद्धविशेषणः पक्षः
3. सिद्धसाधनता
4. असिद्धो हेतुः
5. विरुद्धो हेतुः
6. अनैकान्तिकः हेतुः
7. अनध्यवसितः हेतुः
8. कालात्ययापदिष्टः हेतुः
9. प्रकरणसमः हेतुः
10. सत्प्रतिसाधनः हेतुः
11. साध्यविकलो दृष्टान्तः
12. साधनविकलो दृष्टान्तः

To prove that the conclusion in certain syllogism is not valid it is enough that one clear fallacy, formal or material, is pointed out. But Madhvācārya has taken pains to show that all the three important terms, namely, the minor term, the middle term and the illustration, are faulty and that each of them is vitiated by more than one fault, so much so, the conclusion is egregiously wrong.

It is noteworthy that Madhvācārya is here concerned with invalidating the syllogism. His arguments against the theory of falsity of the world are given elsewhere.

It would be worthwhile to recount the arguments adduced by Madhvācārya and his followers to refute

the theory of world illusion. The world is perceived as true and real. No one has experience that the objects perceived disappear like the illusory objects produced by the magician or like the rope-snake which disappears when true knowledge dawns. Moreover the analogy of the magician's illusions is inapplicable to the world, for the magician does not perceive his magic creation whereas God perceives his own creation. Therefore the world cannot be regarded as *māyā* or illusion.

The argument, resorted to by the Absolutists to establish the falsity of the world, based upon the fact that the world is cognizable like dream experiences, is analysed and it is pointed out that even Brahman would, in that case, become false as it is also cognizable in some form or other. Moreover Brahman being the substratum of all that is experienced in this world, it is urged that Brahman will have to be regarded as false for the same reason as that on account of which the world is called false. Another argument forwarded by the Absolutists is that what is limited and finite with regard to time and space is false. It is pointed out here that it is illogical to assert that a thing does not exist at one particular place or time. The contention, that present perception of the world-appearance may be ultimately contradicted just as dream experience is later contradicted by waking experience, cannot be admitted because even that knowledge may stand the chance of being contradicted and it will go on endlessly. Thus from whatever point of view one may discuss the doctrine of falsity of the world, one finds it untenable and there are no proofs which support it.

प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वानुमानखण्डनम्

PRAPAÑCAMITYĀTVĀNUMĀNAKHANDANAM

Madhvā-ārya begins the refutation of the Advaitin's syllogism by first stating the syllogism as follows:

Text: विमतं मिथ्या । दृश्यत्वात् । यदित्यं तत्तथा ।

यथा सम्प्रतिपन्नम् ।

Translation: The world, which is the controversial subject of discussion, is false; because it is a thing that can be apprehended by the senses. Anything that can be so apprehended is of that nature (false) as is admitted on all hands.

Explanation: In this syllogism 'विमतं मिथ्या' is the statement of प्रतिज्ञा । दृश्यत्वात् is the statement of हेतु and यदित्यं तत्तथा gives the व्याप्ति and यथासम्प्रतिपन्नम् is the उदाहरण. The term विमतं means a controversial subject. Here it stands for जगत्. The controversy lies in the fact that the Advaitins contend that the world is false or illusory; while the Dvaita philosophers insist that it is real (cf. सत्यत्वमिथ्यात्वम्यां विमतविषयोभूतं— Jayatīrtha.) This is an instance of the adjective used as noun just like the rich, for 'rich people'. Here the use is significant. Śrī Madhva wants to emphasise the controversial nature of the subject of discussion, viz. जगत्. विमतं is the पक्ष according to Nyāya terminology, the minor term in the syllogism according to western Logic. मिथ्या is the major term or the साध्य, according to Indian Logic, the attribute to be established or proved with

regard to the पक्ष. The statement विमतं मिथ्या is the proposition to be proved. In Indian Logic this proposition is stated first and is called the प्रतिज्ञा.

In western Logic the proposition to be proved comes last in the syllogism and is called 'conclusion'.

The term मिथ्या is interpreted to mean 'non-existence' by Śrī Madhva (cf. मिथ्याशब्दस्तु अभाववाच्येव तदन्यत्र प्रमाणाभावात्).¹ The Advaitins themselves give different meanings; सदसद्विलक्षणत्वं and अनिवचनीयत्वं are the two most important among them. The former interpretation lays stress on the fact that the world is different from the real and the unreal; while the latter emphasises that it is something mysterious and indescribable. The original interpretation, one that was given by the first systematiser of the Advaita philosophy, namely Gauḍapādācārya, was that the world is as false as the magician's magic or a castle in the air.

cf. स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।
तथा विश्वमिदं दृष्टं वेदान्तेषु विचक्षणैः ॥²

'As are dreams and magic of the magician or a castle in the air, so is the universe viewed by the wise in the Vedānta'. Thus there is no uniformity of opinion among the Advaita philosophers themselves regarding the interpretation of the term मिथ्या. Madhvācārya has adhered to the meaning, 'false', given by Gauḍapādācārya, and proceeded to examine the syllogism.

1. Viṣṇutattvavivṛitiḥ

2. Gauḍapādakārikā II. 31

The reason (hetu) given by the Advaitins for the conclusion that the world is false, is that it is perceptible. It is Gauḍapādācārya's view that the dream and the waking experiences are identical because both are characterised by the same condition, viz., the characteristic of 'being perceived.' Therefore they are both unreal.

cf. स्वप्नजागरितस्वप्ने ह्येकमाहुर्मनीषिणः ।
भेदानां हि समत्वेन प्रसिद्धेनेव हेतुना ॥

(Thoughtful persons speak of the sameness of the waking and dream states on account of the similarity of objects perceived in both the states.)¹

Another reason given by Gauḍapādācārya for the perceived objects to be considered illusory is that these objects are characterised by non-existence at the beginning and at the end:

cf. आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा²

(That which is non-existent at the beginning and at the end is necessarily so in the middle.)

This is the additional reason for the illusoriness of perceived objects. All the reasons given by the Advaitin to prove the illusoriness of the world are summarised in the syllogism: विमतं मिथ्या । दृश्यत्वात् । जडत्वात् । परिच्छिन्नत्वात् । गुक्तिरूप्यवत् ।

जडत्व is ignorance due to its being 'matter'; परिच्छिन्नत्व is limited nature.

1. Gauḍapādakārikā II. 5.

2. Ibid II. 6.

The characteristic way of expressing the व्याप्ति and the उदाहरण on the part of Madhvācārya is noteworthy.

viz., यदित्यं तत्तथा । यथा सम्प्रतिपन्नम्. The Naiyāyikas generally express the व्याप्ति thus:

यो यो धूमवान् । स स बहिमान्

There is the repetition of the pronouns यद् and तद् and the illustrative example is specifically named. Put in this form the statement of the व्याप्ति in this particular syllogism will be: यद्यत् दृश्यत्वविशिष्टं तत्तत् मिथ्या । यथा शुक्तिरजतम् । Jayatīrtha in his commentary has defended Madhvācārya's having resorted to such a mode of expression. He says, 'यत्तदिति साधारणप्रयोगादेव सर्वोपसंहारसिद्धेः द्विवचनाभावो न दोषाय । गौर्न पदा स्पृष्टव्या इतिवत् । सम्प्रतिपन्नं दृश्यत्वमिथ्यात्ववत्तया इति शेषः । सम्प्रतिपन्नग्रहणेन साध्यविकलत्वादि दृष्टान्तदोषनिरासोऽपि कृतः स्यात् इति शुक्तिरजतमिवेति नोक्तम् ॥

'By using the general form यत्—तत् all things belonging to that class are comprehended just as by using the word गौ. in singular, in expressions like गौर्न-पदा स्पृष्टव्या the whole class of cows is comprehended. Therefore the omission of using यत् and तत् twice is not to be considered a defect. सम्प्रतिपन्नं means that which is comprehended as perceptible and false. By omitting mention of the particular instance शुक्तिरजत and using the general expression यथासम्प्रतिपन्नं the author has avoided the defects of the दृष्टान्त such as (साध्यविकलत्वं) dissimilarity with the साध्य. By साध्यविकलत्वं what is meant is साध्यसमानधर्मविकल i. e. not possessing the attribute similar to that of the साध्य.

The दृष्टान्त which is a सपक्ष ought to possess such an attribute. As शुक्तिरजत does not possess it, that example ought not to be cited according to Sri Madhva. So he has omitted it and given the general statement यथासम्प्रतिपन्नं.

This is Jayatīrtha's explanation why Sri Madhva used the term यथासम्प्रतिपन्नम् instead of यथा शुक्तिरजतम्.

Text: इत्युक्ते जगतोऽभावात् आश्रयासिद्धः पक्षः

Translation: In the above mentioned syllogism the minor term (पक्ष) is non-existent because (according to the Advaitin) the world is non-existent.

Explanation: Sri Madhva begins the discussion by pointing out the defects in the प्रतिज्ञा first. The first defect he notices is आश्रयासिद्धत्वं of the पक्ष. आश्रयासिद्ध is the fallacy in which the existence of the locality (आश्रय) where the property is said to reside is not established. In the present case, the world, by Advaitins' own admission, is (मिथ्या) non-existent. Hence there is no substratum for the साध्यधर्म; therefore the defect is आश्रयासिद्ध as far as the पक्ष is concerned. The reason for calling the पक्ष, आश्रयासिद्ध is given as जगतोऽभावात्—non-existence of the world. The phrase जगतोऽभावात् is also split as जगतः भावात् i. e. on account of the existence of the world. This is not compatible with मिथ्यात्व. Hence also साध्यधर्म will not be a property of पक्ष. So again there is असिद्धत्व. Jayatīrtha justifies the phrase जगतः भावात् by explaining it as 'भावत्वेन असद्विलक्षणत्वेन परेणांगीकृतत्वात् i. e. भावत्व is that which is different from असत् and the Advaitin has characterised the universe as असद्विलक्षण.

In the works on Nyāya आश्रयासिद्धि is treated as a fallacy pertaining to हेतु. The familiar example is, गगनारविन्दं सुरभिः । अरविन्दत्वात् । सरोजारविन्दवत्. Here the middle term, (हेतु) अरविन्दत्व does not have a locality in the sky, and गगनारविन्दं is a non-existent entity. Hence the हेतु is without आश्रय. Similarly in the present instance the universe is non-existent, hence, to qualify it as साध्यधर्मविशिष्ट is illogical.

Text: अनिवचनीयासिद्धेः अप्रसिद्धविशेषणः (पक्षः)

Translation: Since indescribability is an attribute not admitted by all (though admitted by the Advaitins) the minor term (पक्ष) is defective, the defect being inadmissibility of the attribute.

Explanation: Sri Madhva's definition of पक्ष is साध्यधर्मविशिष्ट i. e. that which has the same attributes as belong to साध्य. The साध्य here is मिथ्या. So मिथ्यात्व is साध्यधर्म. The Advaitin defines मिथ्यात्वं as अनिवचनीयत्व. So according to the Advaitins जगत् has the attribute अनिवचनीयत्व. But the fact that जगत् is अनिवचनीय is not indisputably established (अप्रसिद्ध). Hence Madhvācārya says that the पक्ष is अप्रसिद्धविशेषण.

Text: सदसद्विलक्षण्ये मिथ्यात्वे सिद्धसाधनता

Translation: If the term मिथ्यात्व (falsity) be taken to mean सदसद्विलक्षणत्वं (that which differs from the real as well as the unreal), there occurs the fallacy सिद्धसाधनता (proving that which is already proved).

Explanation: Sri Madhva here refers to another interpretation of the term मिथ्यात्व. The term मिथ्या de-

notes that which is different from the (सत्) real as well as the (असत्) unreal. He says that it means that जगत् is different from the real as well as different from the unreal severally. In that case the Dvaita adherents have already admitted the world being different from the unreal, or in other words that it is real. So the Advaitin, trying to prove that the world is different from the unreal, is attempting to prove what is already proved (सिद्धसाधन).

Text: दृश्यत्वाभावात् असिद्धो हेतुः ।

Translation: On account of absence of perceptibility there occurs the fallacy unconclusive reason.

Explanation: Having dealt with the defects of पक्ष and साध्य Sri Madhva turns his attention to the हेतु. The first defect that he detects there, is that it is असिद्ध. When a परामर्श is obstructed by an error in the apprehension of either व्याप्ति or पक्षधर्मता or पक्षता, the हेतु is called an असिद्धहेतु. Non-existence of पक्ष, or non-existence of हेतु on पक्ष or absence of व्याप्ति obstructs true knowledge of परामर्श and the inference becomes invalid. In the following examples the हेतु is असिद्ध.

1. गगनारविन्दं सुरभिः । अरविन्दत्वात् ।
सरोजारविन्दवत् ।

Here the fallacy is due to non-existence of पक्ष.

2. हृदो बहिमान् । धूमात् ।

Here the fallacy is due to non-existence of हेतु on पक्ष.

3. पर्वतो धूमवान् । वह्निमत्वात् ।

Here the fallacy is due to non-concomitance of धूम and वह्नि

The concomitance, wherever there is वह्नि there is धूम is not true. There is धूम only where there is आर्द्रन्धनसंयोग. This is called सोपाधिकहेतु, a हेतु qualified by a condition (उपाधि).

In the present instance of inferring मिथ्यात्व for the reason that the universe is दृश्य, the fallacy is due to absence of real दृश्यत्व (दृश्यत्वाभावात्). There is a subtle point raised here. The दृश्यत्व (perceptibility) that is stated as पक्षधर्मता is not of the real-character, but appearance-character, such as the दृश्यत्व experienced in the case of dream objects and shell-silver (शुक्तिरजत). So there is absence of सत् दृश्यत्व i. e. there is दृश्यत्वाभाव and therefore the fallacy is असिद्धः हेतुः असिद्धः हेतुः may also be taken to mean a हेतु that is not established. The contention of the Advaitins is that the दृश्यत्व of the universe is of the same nature as that of the dream-objects or of shell-silver. This is not acceptable to all. Hence the reason given is असिद्धः (unestablished).

Text: अनिर्वचनीयासिद्धेरेव

Translation: For the very reason that the indescribability of the perceptibility (dṛśyatva) is not established, the reason given is inconclusive (asiddha).

Explanation: Śrī Madhva gives here another reason why the given is asiddha. Gauḍapāda has described

the perception of worldly objects as similar to that of dream objects or that of a castle in the air.

cf. स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा

Therefore he emphasises the appearance character of the worldly objects. The attribute the Advaitins employ to characterise worldly objects is anirvacaniya. Hence the dṛśyatva given as the reason is also of that nature. That is, it is anirvacaniyadṛśyatva, not the real dṛśyatva. But this anirvacaniyatva of the dṛśyatva is not acceptable to the Dvaita philosophers. So Śrī Madhva says that anirvacaniyatva is not established. Hence the reason given is defective, it being an asiddha hetu. The inference is, therefore, invalid.

Text: अनिर्वचनीयासिद्धेरेव सपक्षमाभावात् विरुद्धः

Translation: As the attribute 'indescribability' is not an established one, there is in consequence the absence of a similar instance and therefore, there occurs the fallacy of 'contrary reason'.

Explanation: A 'viruddha hetu' is that which is concomitant with the non-existence of the 'sādhyā'. For example, in the following inference शब्दो नित्यः । कृतकत्वात् the reason kṛtakatva is viruddha hetu; for, kṛtakatva is concomitant with anityatva. Such being the nature of viruddha hetu Śrī Madhva's argument, that the हेतु given by the Advaitins is viruddha on account of absence of sapakṣa instance, is not easy to understand. Jayatīrtha has attempted an explanation. The example (सपक्ष) cited in the present instance, namely, Śuktirajata does not possess the anirvacaniyadṛśyatva as an attri-

bute; so it is not a sapakṣa but a vipakṣa. Hence there is a sādhyaviparītavyāpti. Therefore the hetu given is viruddha.

Text: आत्मनोऽपि दृश्यत्वादनैकान्तिकः

Translation: As Ātman also (which is nitya) is characterised by the attribute dṛśyatva, the hetu given is too wide (anaikāntika).

Explanation: A hetu which is found in sapakṣa as well as vipakṣa instances is called too general (anaikāntika). This fallacy is also known as savyabbhicāra. In this fallacy the hetu coexists with sādhyā as well as sādhyā bhāva. In the present instance dṛśyatva coexists with things that are mithyā as well as things that are satya (not mithyā), Ātman for instance. Jagat is mithyā according to the Advaitins. Ātman is not mithyā according to their own admission; but both are dṛśya. Hence the hetu is ubhayāntavyāpaka pervading in both kinds of objects mithyā and satya.

Text: जगतोऽभावे अनुमानस्याप्यभावः इति तर्क-
बाधितत्वात् अनध्यवसितः

Translation: When the universe is said to be non-existent, the inference (being a thing included in the universe) is also non-existent. This leads to the fallacy inconclusiveness.

Explanation: A hetu is said to be anadhyavasita when the inference derived from that hetu is nullified by (set aside by) another conclusion and hence there is no certainty about the validity of the first conclusion. The word is derived as न विद्यते अध्यवसितं

यस्मात्. The defect is inconclusiveness. By the term tarkabādhita, Śrī Madhva means that the debate itself is to be set aside. The argument adduced by Śrī Madhva is as follows: 'According to the Advaitic point of view the universe is non-existent, hence it follows that every thing in the universe is non-existent. Hence the inference which is the subject of discussion is also non-existent. Hence there is no meaning in debating about a thing which has no existence at all'. He calls this defect anadhyavasita. This fallacy is not found included in the five kinds of fallacy enumerated by the Naiyāyikas.

Text: प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धत्वात्, विश्वं सत्त्वमित्यादि
वाक्यविरुद्धत्वाच्च कालात्ययापदिष्टः

Translation: The inference is contrary to experience gained by valid cognition through perception and other means. It also contradicts statements like 'the universe is real' etc. found in the sacred scriptures. Therefore there occurs the fallacy called 'kālatyayāpadiṣṭa' (that which is disproved later).

Explanation: Further reasons are given here to prove that the inference is invalid. In the first place, it contradicts everyday experience. Sense perception is counted as one of the means of right apprehension and experience based on sense perception is reliable. No one can deny that our knowledge based on sense-perception is valid. Right apprehension based on sense-perception must be accepted as the most reliable criterion for testing our knowledge gained by other means. As the Advaitic contention that the universe is false (mithyā) is in direct contradiction of our perceptual

knowledge, it is not valid. Moreover there are statements in the scriptures to the effect that the world is real¹ and the above inference of the Advaitins is in contradiction to such texts. Hence the inference is invalid. Śrī Madhva calls this kind of fallacy *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*. It is equivalent to the fallacy *bādhita* of the Naiyāyikas.

Text: रजतं दृष्टमिति भ्रममावत्वात् । विमतं सत्यं, दृश्यत्वात्, आत्मवत् इति प्रयोज्यत्वात् । प्रकरणसमः ।

Translation: The cognition of silver in the mother of pearl is a false apprehension. Moreover, there can be an inference such as 'This universe is real, since it is apprehended, just as Ātman'. For these reasons the conclusion is invalid due to the fallacy, counterbalanced reason.

Explanation: One more fallacy of the *hetu* is pointed out here. The example cited, *śuktirajata* cannot be accepted. The apprehension of silver in a mother-of-pearl is not a right apprehension. Silver is not apprehended at all, for there is no real contact of the sense-organ with silver. A thing which is non-existent is perceived here, and it is due to some fault in the environment or in the sense-organ itself. The mistake is rectified soon after. So that which is the object of illusion (*bhrama*) cannot be cited as an example. The *hetvābhāsa* pointed out here is *prakaraṇasama*, counterbalanced reason. There is an inference '*vimataṁ satyam*' which is based on the reason that the universe

1. a) विश्वे सत्यं मयवाना etc. — Rgveda II. 24.12
b) विश्वं सत्यं कृणुहि विष्टमस्तु — „ III. 30.6

is perceptible like the Ātman. Ātman being real, the universe is also bound to be real. Hence there are two inferences here, '*vimataṁ satyam*' and '*vimataṁ mithyā*,' which counterbalance each other and we are left in doubt which to accept and which to reject. Hence the fallacy is called counterbalanced reason (*prakaraṇasama*). The name is significant. The *hetu* given is not calculated to remove the curiosity created during the discussion and leaves the discussion unconcluded. It is therefore explained as *prakaraṇamanativartamāna* (by Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*). There is another name for this fallacy. It is called *satpratipakṣa*. The essential characteristic of this kind of fallacy is that there are two inferences of equal weight contradicting each other.

Text: विमतं सत्यं प्रमाणदृष्टत्वात्, यदित्यं तत्तया यथात्मा, इति प्रयोगात् सप्रतिसाधनः ।

Translation: 'The universe is real, as there is authoritative declaration to that effect. Whatever is authoritatively declared as real, is really so, as is the case with the soul.' As one can put forward such an inference as the above, there is the fallacy called 'reason which proves the contrary.'

Explanation: On the strength of an inference which is contrary to the inference under discussion and which is drawn on the basis of a different reason, Śrī Madhva declares the inference of the Advaitin fallacious, and calls the fallacy *sapratīśādhana*. The term *sapratīśādhana* means that *hetu* which has a counterbalanced reason proving the contrary. A subtle distinction is made between *prakaraṇasama* and *sapratīśādhana*. In

the first case the same hetu leads to contradictory inferences on the strength of different illustrative examples, in the second the hetu as well as the udāharaṇa are different.

Text: शुक्तिरजतस्याप्यनिर्वचनीयत्वाभावात् साध्यविकलो दृष्टान्तः ।
उक्तप्रकारेण दृश्यत्वाभावात् साधनविकलश्च ॥

Translation: The silver in the mother-of-pearl does not possess the characteristic attribute 'indescribability'; hence it has no common attribute with the 'sādhya'. As there is non-existence of perceptibility, it has no similarity, with the 'hetu' also. Hence the inference, in which the śuktirajata is cited as an example, is invalid.

Explanation: Having disposed off hetu, Śrī Madhva takes up the illustrative example for examination. He observes that the example cited to prove the applicability of the vyāpti has no similarity either with the sādhya or the sādhanā.¹ The example being faulty, the inference is obviously invalid. In the inference under discussion the vyāpti stated is anvaya-vyāpti and the instance cited must be a sapakṣa instance. Sapakṣa means साध्यसमानधर्मविशिष्टः— that thing which possesses the attribute similar to the sādhya. The characteristic attribute of the sādhya is mithyātva or anirvacanīyatva. But according to Śrī Madhva the śuktirajata does not possess this attribute. Hence the illustration is faulty and the inference invalid. Similarly, the śuktirajata does not also have any chara-

1. साध्यविकलः = साध्यसमानधर्मविकलः

साधनविकलः = साधनसमानधर्मविकलः

acteristic common with the hetu. The Śuktirajata is a thing which is not perceived at all. Hence it is not sapakṣa instance. So the illustration does not serve its purpose. Hence the inference is invalid.

The perception of silver in the mother-of-pearl is an erroneous apprehension. Śrī Madhva's contention is that a non-existent silver is apprehended as existent in the mother-of-pearl with which the sense-organ is in contact and this is because some conditions are favourable for this erroneous cognition.

cf. अत्यन्तासतो रजतत्वस्य शुक्तिकायां रजततादात्म्यं भ्रान्तिविषयः ।
The Advaitic theory of error is known as अनिर्वचनीय-
स्याति. Arguing, ('सच्चेन्न बाध्येत, असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत) if it is real
it would not have been stultified, if unreal it would
not have been cognised; therefore, they declare this
silver in the mother-of-pearl as something indescribable
anirvacanīya) its special status defying characterisation
(in terms of sat and asat).

Text: प्रमाणविरुद्धत्वमुपाधिः

Translation: Here the limiting condition (of the hetu) is that it should contradict the means of right cognition.

Explanation: One more fallacy that makes the inference invalid is pointed out here. The generalisation यत्र यत्र दृश्यत्वं तत्र तत्र मिथ्यात्वं is true only under a limiting condition. If dṛśyatva is pramāṇaviruddha, then mithyātva is true. That is the case with śuktirajata. The rajata is perceived but it is negated by other means of right cognition. Hence the rajata is said to be mithyā. Similarly dream experiences are nullified hence they are mithyā. In short the apprehension (dṛśyatva)

of any thing when contradicted by any pramāṇa, renders the thing apprehended, false. As it is not so in the case of the universe, it is real and the inference, that it is false, is invalid.

Having thus successfully repudiated the Advaitic contention that the universe is false or illusory, Śrī Madhva gives the definitions of certain terms such as pakṣa, sapakṣa, etc.

Text: 1) साध्यधर्मविशिष्टः पक्षः
2) साध्यसमानधर्मविशिष्टः सपक्षः
3) साध्यविपरीतधर्मविशिष्टः विपक्षः
4) पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा
5) लिंगं हेतुः
6) निदर्शनं दृष्टान्तः

Translation: 1. A pakṣa (the term which is the subject of the proposition pratijñā) is that which possesses the attribute of the sādhyā.

2. A sapakṣa is that thing which possesses an attribute similar to that of the sādhyā.

3. A vipakṣa is that thing which possesses an attribute opposite to that of the sādhyā.

4. The statement of the pakṣa is the declaration.

5. The characteristic mark of the sādhyā is the hetu in an inference.

6. The dṛṣṭānta in an inference is the illustrative example.

Explanation: Śrī Madhva defines certain technical terms he has used in the course of his arguments.

The terms pakṣa and pakṣatā being of much importance in the matter of inference, a detailed explanation of the same will be found useful. When we infer that mountain has fire on it, we simply infer that property of 'having fire on it' which we generally know is associated with smoke. This particular instance of a mountain is called pakṣa of which an inferrible property can be predicated. Pakṣatā is the characteristic which distinguishes the pakṣa for the time being from other things possessing similar attribute say for example, the kitchen. Thus any mountain is not a pakṣa but it becomes one when we observe smoke on it and desire to infer fire on it. In the beginning we simply know that fire is not ascertained as existing on it, that is, there is non-ascertainment of fire on it. It is otherwise called सिध्यभाववान्. This distinguishes it from other similar things where fire is actually perceived and ascertained. Hence Naiyāyikas define pakṣa as सिध्यभाववान्. Another definition current among the Naiyāyikas is 'सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान्', 'a thing on which the existence of sādhyā is doubted'. The term sidhyabhāva implies both sidhyabhāva as well as desire to infer (सिषाद्यविषा). These two elements सिध्यभाव and सिषाद्यविषा constitute पक्षता. But according to Śrī Madhva it is the presence of the attributes belonging to साध्य that makes a thing the pakṣa in an inference.

The concept of sapakṣa and vipakṣa among the Naiyāyikas also differs from that given by Śrī Madhva. According to the Naiyāyikas what constitutes a sapakṣa is that property of its being the substratum of the sādhyā, the presence of the sādhyā having been previously ascertained. Such a one is kitchen (mahānasā).

Śrī Madhva says that a sapakṣa is a thing possessing properties similar to those of the sādhyā.

A vipakṣa according to the Naiyāyikas is that thing on which the absence of sādhyā is previously determined, such as the lake (in the inference of fire on the mountain). Śrī Madhva's definition gives importance to properties; that thing which possesses properties opposite to those of the sādhyā is vipakṣa. The main point of difference that one notes in these definitions given by the Naiyāyikas and Śrī Madhva is that the Naiyāyikas lay stress on the ascertainment of the sādhyā on the thing cited as instance and on the ascertainment of sādhyābhāva on the vipakṣa instance; while Śrī Madhva emphasises the presence or absence of the properties of the sādhyā on these.

Madhvācārya concludes this dissertation on the मिथ्यात्वानुमान with a benedictory verse.

Text: यो दृश्यते सदानन्दनित्यव्यक्तचिदात्मना ।
निर्दोषाखिलकल्याणगुणवन्दे रमापतिम् ॥

Translation: I bow to that Viṣṇu, the consort of Lakṣmi, who is the abode of all auspicious qualities, who is blameless, and who is the personification of eternal existence, consciousness and bliss.

Here ends the Prāpañcamithyātvānumānakhaṇḍanam.